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Abstract 
 Since independence, Israel has passed through the phases of democratic transition 
from the non-democratic British Mandate Authority of pre-independence Palestine to the 
democratic confirmation of peaceful transfers of power, from founding election through 
critical election. Political developments indicate that Israel has reached a third phase that I 
have called the revitalization phase, and that the Israeli party system is going through 
fundamental changes.  
 Before each of the three elections corresponding to these phases there is a mahapac, 
‘turnabout’, that fundamentally affects the following phase. The founding election is 
preceded by a power struggle over the nature of the state, the critical election by a conflict 
over the power structure and subsequently electability of the dominant party, and the 
revitalizing election by a struggle over party leadership.  
 This thesis uses Game Theory to analyze the three mahapacs in depth, to explain the 
actions that preceded, and perhaps led to, the power changes and the phases of democratic 
transition. On this background it then discusses the relationship between these significant 
events and the transition, and how the latest mahapac and corresponding transition phase 
may imply a fundamental change from two-party to multiparty system.  
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1.0 Israel’s Three Mahapacs: Introduction 
1.1 The three mahapacs 
 Mahapac is Hebrew for “turnabout”, meaning a sudden, significant change. It was 
the term used to describe the shift of power in Israeli politics after the 1977 Knesset 
elections. At this point, David Ben-Gurion’s Mapai party and its successor Labour had held 
power continuously since independence in 1948. With one unexpected victory the 
controversial right-wing politician Menachem Begin and his Likud party replaced Labour as 
the dominant party in Israel, and would continue to hold this position for most of the next 29 
years.  
 Labour’s dominance and the Likud’s marginalization in the previous era were the 
results of the power struggle during the time Palestine was under British Mandate. This 
conflict between the pragmatic and secular socialist organizations with close ties to the 
Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization, and the hard-liner Zionist organizations 
claiming all of the Biblical Holy Land came to a head during the War of Independence in 
1948. A miscalculated challenge to the authority of the state and government marginalized 
Menachem Begin and his Irgun and let David Ben-Gurion establish his political dominance, 
a dominance that would last until 1977.  
 For the 29 years after 1977 the Likud was the dominant party, even though it never 
approximated the monopoly of power Labour and its predecessors enjoyed. Then, prior to 
the 2006 Knesset elections, the party fragmented. An internal power struggle led Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon to leave the party and, with high-profile politicians of other parties, 
found the Kadima, the first party outside Labour and Likud to be able to form a government 
and hold the Prime Minister’s post, and thus end the historical dominance of those two 
parties.  
 These three events all establish the power balance in Israel for the era to follow –in 
the case of the last one, at least as far as we are able to determine. Because of their 
importance, they can be called mahapacs –turnabouts. This thesis will attempt to explain the 
process that led to these events and how they came about. The tool chosen for this is Game 
Theory.  
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1.2 Game Theory 
 Game theory is originally a method from the science of economy, based on the 
Rational Choice theory. The Rational Choice theory assumes that every actor will make the 
choices that will result in the best possible outcome, and that if the ‘wrong’ choices are 
made, leading to a suboptimal outcome, it is because the observer has failed to identify the 
true preferences and priorities of the actor or because the actor based his actions on flawed or 
insufficient information. 
 When actors with conflicting interests meet, Game Theory provides the Rational 
Choice theory with a method to explain their actions within rationality. Each actor has 
different strategies available but the final outcome, which will benefit one more than the 
other, will depend on the strategies of both actors together. Strategy choice then becomes a 
process of anticipating the other’s actions and preferences, and acting to ensure the most 
beneficial outcome. Given perfect information of available strategies and each other’s 
preferences, each actor will make the rational choice. If this information is imperfect, 
because of flawed information, miscalculations or the effects of random chance, the actors 
may well find that the end result of the game is different from what they expected. This last 
point will be vital for this analysis.  
 Game Theory requires reasonably compact events, as games including too many 
actors or spanning too long a time period tend to become over-complex as there are too 
many available strategies and the knowledge and preferences of the actors change. In order 
for this tool to be useful, then, it is necessary to identify the catalyst of the process we seek 
to explain, the relatively limited exchange of responses that leads to the outcome we know, 
without making the mistake of oversimplifying. This analysis will seek to do just that.  
 
1.3 Israel’s political transitions and the three mahapacs 
 From independence to 2006, the state of Israel can be seen to pass through the steps 
of democratic transition from authoritarian rule. In 1948, the first elections are held, the 
founding elections. 29 years later, democracy is confirmed through the first transfer of power 
after the critical election. In the following years the confirmation is strengthened, until 
finally the election of 2006 brings about what seems to be a significant change in the party 
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system, from two-party dominance to a multiparty system. Not entirely coincidentally, these 
phases correspond to the three mahapacs. 
Figure 1.1: governments 1948-1977 
Knesset: government Entry date Prime Minister Party 
Provisional 14/05/48 David Ben-Gurion  
1:1 10/03/49 David Ben-Gurion Worker’s Party 
1:2 01/11/50 David Ben-Gurion Worker’s Party 
2:3 08/10/51 David Ben-Gurion Worker’s Party 
2:4 24/12/52 David Ben-Gurion Worker’s Party 
2:5 26/01/54 Moshe Sharett Worker’s Party 
2:6 29/06/55 Moshe Sharett Worker’s Party 
3:7 03/11/55 David Ben-Gurion Worker’s Party 
3:8 07/01/58 David Ben-Gurion Worker’s Party 
4:9 17/12/59 David Ben-Gurion Worker’s Party 
5:10 02/11/61 David Ben-Gurion Worker’s Party 
5:11 26/06/63 Levi Eshkol Worker’s Party 
5:12 22/12/64 Levi Eshkol  Worker’s Party 
6:13 12701/66 Levi Eshkol Labour Alignment 
6:14 17/03/69 Golda Meir Labour Alignment 
7:15 15/12/69 Golda Meir Labour Alignment 
8:16 10/03/74 Golda Meir Labour Alignment 
8:17 03/06/74 Yitzhak Rabin Labour Alignment 
(Knesset 2009) 
 From the first mahapac at the time of the founding election to the second, at the time 
of the critical election, every government is led by what will become the Labour party. Then, 
in 1977, the picture changes.  
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Figure 1.2: governments 1977-2009 
Knesset: government Entry date Prime Minister Party 
9:18 20/06/77 Menachem Begin Likud 
10:19 05/08/81 Menachem Begin Likud 
10:20 10/10/83 Yitzhak Shamir Likud 
11:21 13/09/84 Shimon Peres Labour Alignment 
11:22 20/10/86 Yitzhak Shamir Likud 
12:23 22/12/88 Yitzhak Shamir Likud 
12:24 11/06/90 Yitzhak Shamir Likud 
13:25 13/07/92 Yitzhak Rabin Labour 
13:26 22/11/95 Shimon Peres Labour 
14:27 18/06/96 Binyamin Netanyahu Likud 
15:28 06/07/99 Ehud Barak Labour 
15:29 07/03/01 Ariel Sharon Likud 
16:30 28/02/03 Ariel Sharon Likud 
17:31 04/05/06 Ehud Olmert Kadima 
18:32 31/03/09 Binyamin Netanyahu Likud 
(Knesset 2009) 
 From 1977 to 2006, from the second mahapac to the third, the Likud is dominant, 
though without the monopoly of power enjoyed by Labour in the previous era. Then, in 
2006, a new party appears and proceeds to take the Prime Minister’s post and later join the 
Likud’s government as the strongest party (28 seats to 27 (Knesset 2009)) in 2009.  
 It seems obvious that there are, indeed, three mahapacs in Israeli politics. This thesis 
will seek to explain how they came about.  
 
 
13 
 
1.4 Disposition 
 Following this introduction, I will begin by briefly discussing transition theory and 
how this applies to the case of Israel.  
 The third chapter will look at Game Theory and discuss the various tools from the 
method that will be used in the further analysis.  
 The fourth chapter will identify the most important social groups and political 
cleavages that make up Israeli society and, as importantly, electorate. This will serve to give 
context to the analyses that follow.  
 The fifth chapter begins the analysis proper by giving a brief historical background 
for the first of the three games, describing the beginnings of Zionism and Jewish 
immigration to Palestine and the situation under the British Mandate until independence in 
1948.  
 From this background, we can begin the first of the games: The Altalena Game. 
During the War of Independence against the Arab states, the provisional government under 
David Ben-Gurion faced a challenge to the state’s authority from Menachem Begin’s Irgun 
militia. The Altalena game seeks to explain the events and choices made that led to the 
political marginalization of Menachem Begin –at least temporarily.  
 From the aftermath of the Altalena game, the seventh chapter describes the “Labour 
era” from 1948 to the second mahapac in 1977 and gives the necessary background for the 
second game.  
 The second game played is the Mahapac Game, so named because the events of 1977 
introduced the term. After nearly 30 years in power the Labour party faced a combination of 
internal and external problems that led to their downfall and Menachem Begin’s Likud 
party’s victory in the 1977 Knesset elections. This game attempts to explain the actions of 
the various factions in the Labour party that contributed to their defeat.  
 The ninth chapter gives a brief historical background of the Likud era, from Begin’s 
rise to power until the third and last game.  
 The third game in this analysis describes the fragmentation of the dominant Likud 
party and the emergence of the Kadima before the 2006 elections. As Prime Minister Ariel 
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Sharon made unpopular decisions he was challenged by Binyamin Netanyahu, head of the 
internal opposition, and the result was the collapse of the Likud and the establishment of the 
first truly powerful third party in Israel. This third game looks at the process that led to this 
outcome.  
 With all three games played, this thesis will conclude by summing up what the three 
games have shown about the three mahapacs, and discuss what, if anything they have in 
common.  
 
1.5 A note on terminology 
 ‘Zionism’, as used in this thesis, is the ideology that seeks to establish and uphold a 
Jewish homeland or state in the area of Biblical Israel in the territory of the British Mandate 
of Palestine. Zionism varies in its territorial demands, where soft-liner or ‘minimalist’ 
Zionists may be content with limited territories the hard-liner or ‘maximalist’ Zionists may 
seek Jewish control of the entirety of historical Land of Israel.  
 With the attention given to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Zionism and Zionist 
have become loaded terms. It is neither the purpose of this thesis nor the intention of the 
author to comment on the rights and wrongs of this conflict and the term is used in 
accordance with the above definition and in a strictly descriptive sense.  
 
 
2.0 Israel and democratic transition from authoritarian rule 
  
 With the Declaration of Independence in 1948, Israel took the step from British 
Mandate to an independent state. In the course of this process, a new Israeli government 
replaced the outside British Mandate Authority and thus made the first step of the transition 
from dependent, essentially undemocratic rule to democracy. 
 Transition theory is the theory of the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic 
regime. Although the British government of the Mandate era can by no stretch of the 
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imagination be considered authoritarian in Britain itself, the same is not true regarding its 
position in the colonies, mandates and other possessions in which the majority of the 
population were not British citizens and therefore not eligible to vote. The Israeli Declaration 
of Independence can therefore be considered the first phase in the Israeli transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy, a position that gains extra weight if the levels of conflict and 
violence in the last years of the Mandate are taken into consideration.  
 A democratic transition is a process where an authoritarian regime breaks down and 
is replaced by a democratic regime. This will lead to a transitional period with the adoption 
of a constitution, the introduction of democratic institutions and norms and the competition 
for power, and the abolishment of the authoritarian power structures. If successful, this will 
be succeeded by a period of consolidation, during which democratic values become 
predominant, a party system is established, and a series of peaceful transfers of power takes 
place (Østerud, Goldmann, Pedersen 1997: 41-42). The democratic system is considered to 
be consolidated when the key political institutions of the systems are regarded as the only 
legitimate arena for the process of political competition for power by all the significant 
political groups, who adhere to the rules of the game (Günther, Diamandouros, Puhle 1995: 
7).  
 One of the benchmarks in this transition is the founding election, the first election in 
the democratizing system. This event introduces democracy to the people, affirming the 
democratic intent of the driving forces behind the transition if it is convincingly executed 
(O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986: 57). However, the establishment of a democratic process is not 
enough in itself –as already mentioned, democratic values must be internalized and dominant 
for the transition to be complete. The election confirming this is the critical election –the 
election where the governing party from the founding election is peacefully replaced by the 
opposition when required by the election outcome. This is the first of the series of peaceful 
transfers of power, and with this the transition can be said to be successful.  
 How, then, does democratic transition relate to Israel? 
 On January 25. 1949, eight months after the Declaration of Independence, the 
elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, and the first government to result from 
this Assembly replaced the provisional government established at independence on March 
10.. There is no reason to doubt the ‘democraticness’ of this election, and as the first election 
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after the end of the undemocratic British Mandate this is Israel’s founding election. This 
sudden end of the authoritarian regime is the reason why transitory pacts do not apply to 
Israel, as the Mandatory power withdrew from the region rather than having to coexist with 
the new regime and therefore had little incentive to force negotiated transition. 
 However, despite the Mandate the 1949 elections were not Israel’s first brush with 
democracy. The process of institutionalization of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in 
Palestine) through the Jewish Agency, Histadrut labour organization, local councils and 
other organizations of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) had given both the electorate 
and the political elite experience in democratically organized organizations and institutions –
and it was these very organizations and institutions that were to be the basis for the new 
state. Israel’s founding election, therefore, took place after only a brief period of actual 
transition because it had existing foundations to build on.  
 However, the “series of peaceful transfers of power” takes a longer time to manifest. 
The dominant political organizations from the pre-independence era remained in power until 
the 1977 election, which is Israel’s critical election. At this point, the first true power transfer 
takes place, as the Likud replaces Labour as the governing party for the first time. While the 
Israeli system appeared democratic since independence, it took nearly 30 years for this to be 
confirmed through an electoral loss to cause the governing party to step down peacefully and 
thus confirm its adherence to the democratic rules of the game. However, a single power 
transfer is hardly a “series”, and while the actual concern for the Likud’s following the rules 
may not have been all that strong Begin was perceived by some as a danger to the state of 
Israel and, ironically, as we shall see this was one of the reasons for his electoral victory in 
1977.  
 The Likud remained in power until the 1992 elections, even dominating the Labour-
Likud “National Unity” governments of 1984-1990. In 1992, Labour returned to power 
under Yitzhak Rabin and was replaced by the Likud under Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996. 
Only at this point, after 48 years of independence, can the Israeli democracy be said to have 
passed through a series of peaceful power transfers and have completed its democratic 
transition as the system has been through four actual transfers. All transfers, though, have 
been between the two dominant parties –Labour and the Likud, or their predecessors, which 
at this point had had all Prime Ministers and only rarely shared power with each other. The 
Israeli party system, while having numerous parties, was essentially a two-party system as 
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one of the two major parties was necessary to form any majority government and the 
cleavages and political tensions were too strong for stable minority governments.  
 It took until the 2006 elections for a third party to claim the Prime Minister. This 
party was the Kadima, a centrist party split off from the Likud and including ex-Labour 
notables. It won a convincing victory in what I have chosen to term Israel’s revitalization 
election. With the emergence of the Kadima, which also gathered the most support in the 
2009 elections but became junior partner in a Likud government because of the latter’s 
stronger coalition, the Israeli party system has finally moved from essentially two-party to a 
multiparty system with more than two potential coalition-building parties and with more 
parties big enough to potentially challenge the now-reduced dominant parties. Whereas the 
founding election introduced the democratic system and the critical election confirmed it, the 
revitalization election can be seen as the result of the power transfers following the critical 
one and finally breaks away from the pattern of the pre-state Yishuv and the internal 
conflicts of the founding of the state of Israel. The new state of Israel was, because of its 
existing structures, able to swiftly progress through Rokkan’s four phases of state- and 
nation-building (Flora 1999: 131-133), but took longer to proceed through transition. 
Transition is normally considered a relatively short process, but in the case of Israel it takes a 
very long time even without the introduction of the last, revitalizing election. Transition in 
this case is also the final step in the state-building process, and the three games played in this 
analysis tie in with these three elections.  
The Altalena Game of 1948 is played immediately before the founding election and, 
as we shall see, is played over the ‘stateness’ of the new state, its centralization of power and 
monopoly of violence. It is obviously heavily affected by the events and developments of the 
pre-state era, particularly the respective policies and levels of influence of the various 
factions, and it sets the tone for the next 29 years. It is largely because of the Altalena Game 
that the critical election took so long to manifest.  
The Mahapac Game of 1977 is the game of the critical election. It is played over 
internal party power, but it is influenced by the outcome of the Altalena Game through the 
marginalization of the main political opposition and the statism and centralization that 
resulted. Its outcome prepares the ground for the mahapac of 1977 and the Labour 
government’s first loss of power to the Likud. This leads to the necessary “series of peaceful 
transfers of power”, dominated though the next 29 years are by the Likud.  
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The final game is the Kadima Game of 2006, resulting from the erosion of the 
dominance of the two main blocs from the Mandate era through the successful transition 
from Mandate to democracy and giving Israel its first centrist government, thereby 
introducing the multiparty system.  
 
 
3.0 Rationality even in defeat: Rational Choice, Game Theory and uncertainty  
 
3.1 Rational Choice 
This analysis aims to explain in some depth the choices and events that led to the 
three power shifts in Israeli politics, including the actions and choices of the principal actors. 
The method chosen for this task is Rational Choice theory, more specifically Game Theory.  
Rational Choice theory is the theory of how choices are made, based on a number of 
assumptions regarding the one making the choice –the actor. Most importantly, in order for 
the theory to apply, the actor or actors must be assumed to be rational. Jon Elster’s “thin” 
theory of rationality calls an action rational if it results from consistent beliefs and desires on 
behalf of the actor: the rational action in a given situation is one the actor believes will lead 
to a desired result. Elster’s “broad” theory of rationality has stronger requirements, 
demanding that beliefs are based on available information and desires are based on 
autonomous preferences, excluding wishful thinking and extreme conformism as valid 
reasons for a rational choice. His “thin” theory requires consistency, whereas his “broad” 
theory requires consistency, reflection and autonomy (Hovi 2008: 18). I deem Elster’s “thin” 
theory to be sufficient for this analysis, but the detailed study of the events and their 
background will where necessary include descriptions of the reflections and autonomy 
behind the actions in addition to their consistency with beliefs and desires.  
Rational Choice theory has three main branches, as laid out by John C. Harsanyi: 
Utility Theory, where rational action results in maximization or perceived maximization of 
the actor’s utility, Game Theory, where two interacting, rational actors seek to maximize 
their own utility, and Ethics, where the actor’s rational preferences are based on his moral 
value judgments (Hovi 2008: 17-18). For the purpose of this analysis I will focus on Game 
19 
 
Theory as the events in question need to be explained by actor interaction, as will become 
evident.  
 
3.2 Game Theory 
Roger A. McCain defines Game Theory as “the study of the choice of strategies by 
interacting rational agents” (McCain 2004: 3), making it a tool to study and hopefully 
explain the choices made when actors, acting rationally, react to each other by representing 
the possible choices and outcomes when two actors interact as a game played between two 
opponents.  
These games have a number of requirements. We need to identify the actors –the 
players of the game. This is generally not difficult, as the primary choice-makers should be 
evident from the events we seek to analyze. We need to assess their options at each point, 
their results and the preferences each actor have regarding the different outcomes. This 
requires a certain amount of background research on the actors and the environment in which 
they make their choices. Most importantly, it is as already mentioned assumed that the actors 
behave rationally –that they seek the outcome they believe is best for themselves, based on 
the information available. Rational behaviour is a necessary assumption for Rational Choice 
theory and Game Theory, but in some cases it may be necessary to explain why suboptimal 
or seemingly suboptimal choices were made. These will be dealt with as we encounter them.  
In order to explain actions it is necessary to rank the actors’ preferences. In this 
analysis, ordinal values will suffice and so each outcome is ascribed an ordinal value from 1 
to N, N being the number of outcomes identified in the game. 1 indicates the least preferred 
outcome, N indicating the most preferred outcome. With the outcomes thus ranked, it is easy 
to identify which outcomes are preferred by which actors –and, at a glance, to see how one 
actor’s preferences may well clash with another’s.  
Games can be played in one of two forms: normal form and extensive form. The 
normal form is represented as a table listing the actors’ strategies along the margin and their 
respective outcomes of the different combinations of strategies in the cells. The extensive 
form is represented as a game tree diagram, with each choice of strategy made by an actor 
shown as a node and with each strategy branch leading to an outcome or a new node 
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(McCain 2004: 11). The games in this analysis will be solved using the extensive form, 
reverting to the normal form to identify dominant strategies. The reason for this is twofold: 
the extensive form is a better visual presentation of games that are played over a period of 
time, and has the advantage of allowing for solving by backwards induction which is easily 
portrayed in text.  
Backwards induction solution of extensive form games is done by letting the actor in 
the final node eliminate the strategy or strategies in that node leading to the least preferred 
outcome or outcomes. This solves this basic subgame, and gives an outcome for the relevant 
strategy in the preceding node. The actor in that node can then repeat the process until the 
outcome of the game is found and we can, when going through the nodes in chronological 
order, see the process of choices that lead to the final outcome.  
In addition to the respective values for the actors, there are other factors that tell us 
something about the outcome. These will be identified in the analysis as appropriate.  
If one strategy gives an actor a higher payoff than another regardless of the actions of 
other actors, the first strategy dominates the second. If one of an actor’s strategies dominates 
all the others, this is the dominant strategy in the game. If both players have dominant 
strategies, their combination is the dominant strategy equilibrium for the game (McCain 
2004: 33-34). Dominant strategies are best identified through normal form games because of 
its organized structure compared to the extended game tree. They are interesting because of 
what they tell us about the game played –the existence of dominant strategies means the 
outcome is given beforehand, though that may well not be evident to either actor in the 
game.  
Since extended games are solved by solving the subgames sequentially, they allow us 
to identify the Nash equilibrium: if the strategies chosen in a subgame are the best responses 
to the actions of other actors, that subgame is a Nash equilibrium. If the strategies chosen in 
the game as a whole correspond to the subgame Nash equlibria, the game is a Nash 
equilibrium game (McCain 2004: 47-48).  
In games with incomplete information, Nash equilibria are less straightforward. In 
retrospect the choices made may not have been the best responses, even though it seemed to 
be at the time. If the chosen strategies are the best responses given the actors’ beliefs and 
perceptions at the time of choosing, and the actors’ perceptions are updated as a result of 
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observations (through Bayes’ Rule if possible), it is called a Bayes’ Perfect equilibrium. All 
the games in this analysis factors in some degree of incomplete information through 
uncertainty, so we will need to identify whether the games are Bayes’ Perfect equlibria. 
Bayes’ Rule is a method of evaluating the probabilities of something being true given the 
observation of something else. It will not be directly used in the analysis due to the nature of 
the subject matter, but a similar judgment call is at the heart of the actors’ choices of strategy 
in the games with incomplete information described. Bayes’ Rule:  
Probability of A if X = (Probability of X if A) (Probability of A) /(Probability of X) 
(McCain 2004: 98-99, Hovi 2008: 97-98).  
 If no other outcome than the outcome chosen has a higher preference value for one 
actor without also having a lower preference value for another actor, the outcome is Pareto 
optimal (McCain 2004: 187-188). This is determined to be the most efficient outcome, as 
there is no way to improve the outcome of the game for one actor without worsening it for 
another. The Pareto optimal is found by simply comparing payoffs for the different 
outcomes.  
 
3.3 Uncertainty 
 These are tools for evaluating the outcome of the game –whether or not it was, in 
retrospect, unavoidable, and how the actors’ respective strategies and payoffs compare. 
Mostly, this analysis will use simple game theory, with games played in the extensive form 
and further analyzed in the normal form where necessary. However, as will become evident, 
the games played can only approximate the events they portray by introducing incomplete 
information and uncertainty.  
 Normally, Game Theory assumes that all actors have perfect information of the 
possible strategies and outcomes and of each other’s preferences. This assumption is 
necessary for us to be able to identify rational behaviour. However, sometimes there is 
obvious uncertainty about the result of a strategy –elections being a prime example- or the 
actors assumed to be rational choose strategies that prove to be suboptimal. In the latter case, 
assuming a miscalculation on their part allows us to continue to assume rationality and 
therefore use Game Theory.  
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 Uncertainty is introduced through a separate node, in which the actor is Nature. This 
node will then divide the succeeding subgame into two or more subgames, with potentially 
different outcomes on key strategies depending on the strategy chosen by Nature –how the 
uncertainty proves to play out. The actors’ strategies, then, are largely dependent upon how 
they believe the chances are for the different outcomes of the Nature node as this will affect 
the payoffs they will receive from outcomes following Nature. Choosing to push for 
democratic elections, for example, is far more favourable if you win.  
 In a game with two possible strategies for Nature, the most complexity this analysis 
will need, one strategy is given a probability of (p) and the other a probability of (1-p). The 
actors then ascribe a probability percentage to (p) for the first strategy, recalculated to a 
number from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating 100% probability. With only two possible strategies 
and the other strategy having a probability of (1-p), the combined probabilities of the two 
strategies will be 1=100%.  
 Using this, then, it is possible to calculate the expected payoff for the strategy leading 
to the Nature node. It is done using this formula: E = a(p) + b (1-p), where (a) is the payoff 
for the strategy with a probability of (p) and (b) is the payoff for the strategy with a 
probability of (1-p). Introducing the payoffs and perceived probabilities for the strategies, we 
get (E), the expected payoff for the Nature node when the payoffs for the different outcomes 
are controlled for the (perceived) probability of that outcome. This gives the actors the 
necessary information to compare the payoffs of the available strategies and make the 
rational choice –though, of course, this is based on the actors’ perception and what is 
considered the most likely outcome is not always the one that occurs. Hence, Nature solves 
the problem of seemingly irrational behaviour by showing how suboptimal outcomes may be 
the result of perceived optimal strategies. This will be important in an analysis focusing on 
the loss of power, as Nature in this analysis will represent the uncertainty of political 
elections, the electorate’s perception of opposition parties and the unknown preferences of a 
competing actor.  
 
 With these tools, then, we will be able to analyze the three mahapacs through Game 
Theory.  
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4.0 Zionists, Ashkenazim, Sephardim: social groups in Israel  
 
 Israel, being mostly populated by immigrants, has experienced a number of waves of 
immigration and immigration from different regions and cultures. This has led to a number 
of different subcultures being established, with different political priorities and hence 
seeking political representation independently of each other.  
 In his article, Hazan identifies four major political cleavages that are represented in 
Israeli politics: socio-economic, Jewish-Arab, religious-secular and Ashkenazi-Sephardic. In 
addition, there is the later-developed maximalist-minimalist Zionist cleavage. (Hazan, Maor 
2000: 110-111, 125). These cleavages have dominated the Israeli political scene since 
independence and are the manifestations of politically active subcultures, though subcultures 
overlap and may represent two or more cleavages.  
 The socio-economic cleavage, often the mainstay of Western political systems, is 
mainly represented through the socialist camp. The liberals, although present, were never 
institutionalized to the same degree (Hazan, Maor 2000: 112).  
 The Jewish-Arab divide predominantly led to the establishment of dedicated Arab 
parties, championing the cause of the Palestinians or simply the defending the interests of 
Israeli Arabs. These did not really have an opposite Jewish number, the Israeli Jewish side of 
this cleavage being represented by the different takes on Zionism represented in the 
maximalist-minimalist Zionist cleavage. Because of this, the Arab parties tend to be 
ideologically close to the Israeli Jewish socialist-secular camp, which encompass the least 
hard-line Zionists.  
 With immigration often being religiously motivated, it might be natural that there is a 
strong religious subculture, however it is divided between Zionists and non-Zionists, the first 
accepting the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, the other originally opposing this 
as premature before the coming of the Messiah. Hence, the religious Zionists have been 
more prominent politically than the non-Zionists. As the religious parties champion the role 
of religious traditions and values in the public sphere there exists an opposing secular camp, 
wishing to limit the influence of the religious establishment (Hazan, Maor 2000: 112-114).  
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 There are several ethnic cleavages among Israeli Jews, the Ashkenazi-Sephardic 
cleavage being the most important. Despite the specific meanings of the terms, in 
contemporary Israel Ashkenazi and Sephardic refers to Jews of European and North African-
Middle Eastern background respectively, and as such the groups are heterogeneous. The 
cleavage is strengthened by cultural differences, but is centred on the social and political 
dominance of the Ashkenazi group due to the generally higher level of education and 
political and organizational know-how at the time of immigration.  
 The maximalist-minimalist Zionist cleavage concerns the claims to territory, 
especially the disputed territories under Israeli control, and is closely related to the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the peace process. As such, it gained importance in the 1990s after the 
first Intifada. The minimalist Zionist stance, also called dovish or leftist, is generally willing 
to give up captured territories in return for peace with Israel’s neighbours, while the 
maximalist Zionist or nationalist, also called hawkish or rightist, is unwilling to part with 
them. This cleavage has evolved to correlate near-perfectly with the religious-secular 
cleavage disregarding the differences between Zionists and non-Zionists, strengthening an 
existing cleavage by unifying one side while increasing the distance between sides. (Hazan, 
Maor 2000: 125-129).  
 With the transfers of power and the changes in the power balance through the 
mahapacs, the politically dominant group changes and so does the dominant cleavages.  
In the 1948 game the difference between Begin and Ben-Gurion was one of power 
centralization, but they also differed on the socio-economic and religious-secular cleavages, 
the Irgun representing a more liberal and pro-religious stance than the Haganah.  
When the Likud came to power in 1977 it represented a harder line on the Arab-
Israeli conflict and thus a more maximalist Zionist stance, as well as representing the 
Sephardim and being more liberal and pro-religious than the socialist, secular and 
Ashkenazi-dominated Labour Alignment.  
And finally, in 2006 the Likud split over the Zionist cleavage, giving birth to the 
moderate Kadima party as the Likud became more hard-line.  
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5.0 Zionism and the road to independence: Israel before 1948 
5.1 Early Zionism 
 Modern Zionism, the movement from the Jewish homeland, began with the 
emancipation of Jews in Western and Central Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. 
Freed from the confines of the ghettoes, European Jews became more exposed to society’s 
ideological developments. At the same time, the emergence of ethnically based nationalism 
combined with the increased visibility of Jews increased anti-Semitism. The traditional 
strategies of secularization or converting were less viable due to the ethnic component, but 
even so most Jews sought closer assimilation. For those who did not believe assimilation 
would solve the problem, on the other hand, Zionism was the Jewish manifestation of the 
European nationalist sentiments they were exposed to –the wish for a state for the Jewish 
people and an end to their statelessness, which would end their status as outsiders in society 
(Metz 1990: 66-67). 
 In Russia, anticipation of similar developments led to increasing rejection of 
orthodox and conformist ghetto life. This was briefly successful under Tsar Alexander II, but 
after his assassination in 1881 pogroms and repression increased. Eastern European Jewry of 
the 19th century found itself under far more violent attack than in the West. Many emigrated, 
others embraced socialism as an anti-Tsarist ideology, and the idea of a Jewish state in the 
Biblical “Promised Land” as the refuge of a Judaism under attack gathered support (Metz 
1990:  67-69).  
 The combination of emancipation, nationalism and continued anti-Semitism led to 
the establishment of Zionist organizations, lobbying the Great Powers of the time for the 
establishment of a Jewish state outside Europe that they hoped would solve both the 
problems of the Jews and Europe’s “Jew problem”. Perhaps the most important of these 
developments were made in 1897, with the establishment of the WZO on the First Zionist 
Congress in Basel, Switzerland. While Western European Zionism were relatively 
unconcerned with the geographical location of their proposed state, the WZO in the end 
adopted the position of many Eastern European Zionists and had the stated goal of creating 
“for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by Public Law” (Metz 1990: 70-73).  
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5.2 The British Mandate of Palestine 
 During the First World War, the Zionists understood the importance of Great Power 
priorities in deciding the fate of the territories of the Ottoman Empire and lobbied for their 
interests. The British were approached by Zionists and Arab nationalists both, and expressed 
support for both of the seemingly-contradictory goals. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, a 
result of intense lobbying and key sympathizers in Britain, finally committed the British to 
the Zionist goal of a Jewish homeland in Palestine after the war to the detriment of Arab 
interests. This was partially a strategic move, to increase support for the war among Zionists 
in the USA and to establish an ally near the vital Suez Canal. With the establishment of the 
British Mandate of Palestine by the League of Nations in 1922 and the endorsement of the 
Zionist goals and the WZO as the agent for these goals, the Zionist project gathered speed. 
The Arabs, however, felt betrayed by the British and held that the League of Nations acted 
against its own covenant. Arab protests against the British and violence between Jews and 
Arabs in Palestine increased, and the separation of Transjordan, later to become the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from Palestine did little to alleviate this (Metz 1990: 78-84). 
 The outspoken support of the League of Nations and the mandate of the British 
Mandate of Palestine also served to unite Zionism under the banner of the WZO. Despite 
ideological differences between Zionists in and outside Palestine, the WZO through the 
Jewish Agency managed to create institutions in the Yishuv, the Jewish community in 
Palestine, that were to form the basis for the establishment of the state of Israel –including an 
elected assembly and an education system. This period also saw the establishment of the 
Labour party’s predecessor Ahdut Ha’avoda and the Histadrut labour organization by David 
Ben-Gurion. These organizations also provided socialization, integration, welfare and, 
through the Ahdut Ha’avoda and Histadrut militia known as the Haganah, security, for 
immigrants, thus setting the basis for the Labour party’s political dominance of the Yishuv 
and later Israel. There were dissenting voices though, chiefly from Eastern European 
immigrants favouring a stronger Judaist identity over secular socialism and a harder line 
against the Arabs and the British. Two of the groups formed were the Irgun Zvai Leumi and 
the Stern gang, which would form the basis for the Herut party, the Likud’s predecessor 
(Metz 1990: 82-89).  
 The activities of the WZO, including the buying of Arab-owned land, led to concerns 
in the British Mandate Authorities that the Arabs were being marginalized. The Passfield 
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White Paper report in 1930 advised stopping land-buying and immigration, and although 
these recommendations were never fully implemented their partial adoption nevertheless 
cooled relations between the Yishuv and the British, especially as this coincided with the rise 
of anti-Semitism in Germany and increasing pressure from would-be immigrants. British 
policies did not help, however, as the continued British rule combined with Zionist 
expansion led to the Great Arab Revolt in 1936. Violence between Jews and Arabs 
increased, and the British unwillingness or inability to support them turned both parties 
against the Mandate Authorities. In the Yishuv, this increased the importance of the militias, 
including the Haganah, the Irgun, and the Stern gang. The British responded by further 
reducing immigration, but their ability to uphold peace was hard-pressed with the outbreak 
of the Second World War (Metz 1990: 89-94). 
 The Holocaust strengthened Zionist sympathies world-wide, and survivors pressed 
for settlement in Palestine. The perceived lack of British effort to help reduce the disaster 
during the war, most importantly because of the restrictive immigration policies, worsened 
relations between the British and the Yishuv as the scale of the Holocaust became known. 
War-weary, the British were unable or unwilling to keep control over an ever-increasingly 
violent Mandate. In 1947, after establishing the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the 
Transjordan region, the United Nations was asked to plan the partition as the British 
announced their planned withdrawal (Metz 1990: 93-97). 
 On May 14. 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the State of 
Israel. The following day the Mandate was formally ended, the USA recognized the new 
state, and all of Israel’s Arab neighbours invaded.  
 
 
6.0 The First Mahapac: The Altalena Game, 1948 
6.1 The War of Independence and the Altalena 
 One of the first laws of the independent state was the establishment of the Israel 
Defence Force (IDF) and the required enlistment of all able citizens, including militia-
members. The various militias had been at odds over the degree of adherence to Jewish 
Agency instructions and the methods to be used in the struggle for independence, the Irgun 
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especially being violently anti-British whereas the Haganah focused on the conflict with the 
Arabs and political resistance and even cooperated with the British in the war against 
Germany. These differences led to the Haganah declaring the “Season” during the Mandate 
era, an anti-Irgun operation which led to the exposure and arrest of significant numbers of 
Irgun members and supporters by the British. Significantly the Irgun, more than willing to 
use violence against the British as evident from the King David Hotel-bombing in 1946, 
chose not to use violence against the Haganah (Sprinzak 1999: 32-40). With the 
establishment of the IDF, negotiations began for the inclusion of the militias, among them 
the Irgun. The agreement that was reached between the David Ben-Gurion’s government and 
the Irgun stipulated the dissolution of the group as a military organization, the handing over 
of equipment to the IDF and the cease of independent equipment acquisitions. However, the 
Irgun members were allowed to join the IDF in their existing units, and the divisions fighting 
in Jerusalem were allowed to remain independent as Israel did not, at this point, claim 
sovereignty over the city (Sprinzak 1999: 20). 
 Into this complex merger of rival groups sailed the Altalena. The ship was bought by 
the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation, effectively the American branch of the 
Irgun, and carried a cargo of Jewish volunteers and weapons secretly given by the French 
government, which had ties to European Irgun-supporters and wanted an ally in the region 
(Sprinzak 1999: 18).  
 When the ship finally left France on June 11., the Irgun was supposed to be 
integrated into the IDF, and a UN-brokered truce banning the import of weapons was in 
effect. Due to the scale of the operation, its cover was blown and Menachem Begin, head of 
the Irgun in Israel, contacted the government to work out a deal concerning the 
shipment.(Sprinzak 1999: 18-23). Thus, the Altalena Game begins.  
 
6.2 The Events 
 Begin’s initial request was for the government to accept that a portion of the weapons 
were given to the non-IDF Jerusalem divisions and the rest primarily being used to arm 
Irgun recruits who were to join the IDF. After all, the shipment could benefit the entire 
Israeli war effort. While the question of the precise allotment of arms remained ambiguous, 
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Begin was given the go-ahead for the ship to land at Kfar Vitkin beach, isolated from UN 
observers and, not entirely coincidentally, a Haganah bastion. 
As Begin and Irgun members arranged the unloading of equipment to the beach and 
the sending of volunteers to immigration centres for registration, Ben-Gurion called a 
cabinet meeting. As the cabinet did not already know of the shipment they were shocked by 
the breach of treaty, and, fearing the implications of Begin’s requests, IDF troops were sent 
to encircle the beach and take possession of the weapons. As Irgun volunteers were arrested 
and warning shots were fired, the ship was reloaded and a stand-off began. When Begin 
received an ultimatum from the commander demanding the surrender of the ship and 
shipment, he refused and tension increased (Sprinzak 1999: 23-24).  
Despite negotiations, no progress was made and it became increasingly evident that a 
violent confrontation was possible. As the IDF began preparations for an assault, Irgun 
troops deserted en masse and clashes between IDF and Irgun troops caused casualties on 
both sides despite the general reluctance of the soldiers to fight other Jews.  
Faced with an increasingly hostile IDF and unwilling to surrender, Begin boarded the 
Altalena and sailed for Tel Aviv where Irgun had strong support and where an IDF assault 
would cause public outcry. Subsequently, the ship was beached just outside Tel Aviv beach.  
With the arrival of the ship in Tel Aviv, tension mounted between IDF and Irgun 
troops in the city as well as civilian supporters of both sides. Unloading began without Begin 
showing any signs of surrender, and Ben-Gurion refused further negotiations. The IDF began 
shooting at the ship and the boats unloading the cargo and violence erupted in the city. 
Finally, the Altalena was set ablaze and evacuated under fire (Sprinzak 1999: 25-30).  
 
6.3 The Altalena Game 
 From the brief list of events above we can identify a number of nodes where crucial 
decisions are made. These will form the basis of the game structure.  
The first obvious node is when Ben-Gurion was informed of the shipment and 
Begin’s requests. The shipment was an obvious breach of treaty and Begin’s requests could 
be seen as an attempt to strengthen his faction in Israel. This was of course made more 
suspect by the initial secrecy. At this point, Ben-Gurion had two options. One would be to 
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accept Begin’s request, allow the ship to land and thus strengthen the IDF but especially the 
Irgun. This would end the game immediately. This option is called ‘Passive’ in the following 
analysis. The other option would be to refuse Begin’s request and demand the surrender of 
the shipment. This would continue the game and give Begin the next move. This option is 
called ‘Demand’ in the following analysis.  
If Ben-Gurion did not end the game in the previous node, Begin would have to react 
to his demands. A demand of surrender would be insulting and the Irgun would not benefit 
from its political and logistical coup, but there would also be the threat of violence and the 
unity of the Yishuv in face of danger to consider. The first option would therefore be to end 
the game by bowing to Ben-Gurion’s demands, this will be called ‘Acquiesce’ in the 
following analysis. The second option would be to refuse the demands and attempt to secure 
Irgun control over the shipment. This will be called ‘Refuse’, and would lead to Ben-
Gurion’s next and final node.  
Ben-Gurion’s final node, given that the game has not already been ended, requires 
him to choose between seizing the shipment in a potentially violent confrontation or backing 
down and let Begin keep it. Either option would end the game, the first possibly turning the 
Altalena game into a game of an Israeli civil war, the second accepting defeat. The first 
option will be called ‘Aggressive’, the second ‘Accepting’.  
The basic structure of the game tree as presented will look like this:  
Figure 6.1: simple game tree   DBG 
Demand  Passive 
 
MB    
Refuse  Acquiesce    
 
DBG       
Aggressive Accepting      
 
DBG is short for David Ben-Gurion. MB is short for Menachem Begin.  
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6.4 Preferences and Payoff Tables 
 There are four possible outcomes of the above game tree:  
Figure 6.2: outcome table 
-DBG passive 
-MB acquiesce 
-DBG aggressive 
-DBG accepting 
 
 In order to solve the game, it is necessary to find the preferences for both players for 
each outcome. As the game tree is quite uncomplicated, it is justified to assume that both 
players were perfectly aware of the structure from the beginning and so could rank their 
preferences.  
 David Ben-Gurion would quite obviously prefer Begin to ‘Acquiesce’ when he 
demanded control over the shipment. This would give the government control over the 
weapons to use in the war effort, and just as importantly see Begin and the Irgun humiliated. 
Perhaps most importantly of all, it would prevent the Irgun from using this coup and any 
subsequent military successes to strengthen their position in the Yishuv and possibly even 
challenging the monopoly of violence.  
 For his second preference, Ben-Gurion would act ‘Aggressive’ when faced with 
Begin’s refusal. This would not be done with a light heart, as despite long and severe 
rivalries there was a tradition of non-violence between the political groups of the Yishuv, 
and this act would break this tradition and, as importantly, risk internal conflict while still at 
war with the Arabs. Even so, having to deal with an armed dissident group after the war, one 
that had achieved popularity through successes in the field, would be worse.  
 Ben-Gurion’s third preference would be ‘Accepting’ the situation when Begin 
refused his demands. While not desirable because it would give Begin control over the 
weapons and strengthen the Irgun, at least the government would have some justification in 
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backing off after Begin’s non-compliance because of the risk of internal division during 
wartime.  
 His last preference would be acting ‘Passive’ when faced with Begin’s initial 
requests. The end result would be much the same as Accepting’, but with further humiliation 
because the situation never even escalated to the point where backing off would be 
justifiable.  
 For Menachem Begin, he would obviously prefer Ben-Gurion to end the game early 
by being ‘Passive’, giving the Irgun control over the shipment and leaving him to 
concentrate on the war effort.  
 His second preference would be Ben-Gurion ‘Accepting’ the situation and backing 
off when refused. It would still give him the shipment, but cost time and effort that could be 
better used elsewhere.  
 The third preference would be to ‘Acquiesce’ when faced with Ben-Gurion’s 
demands. Far from desirable, avoiding internal conflict in a dangerous situation would be 
important for Begin, as much because of the danger to the Yishuv as a whole as because of 
Irgun’s weakness compared to the IDF.  
 The fourth preference would be Ben-Gurion acting ‘Aggressive’ when refused. This 
could cripple the Irgun, divide the Yishuv and weaken the state against its external enemies. 
To the Zionist Begin, this would be an unacceptable risk.  
 Ranking these preferences from 1 (worst) to 4 (best), we get the following payoff 
table for the Altalena game:  
Figure 6.3: payoff table 1 
 DBG MB 
DBG passive 1 4 
MB acquiesce 4 2 
DBG aggressive 3 1 
DBG accepting 2 3 
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6.5 The First Game 
 Inserting the preferences into the basic game, it looks like this:  
Figure 6.4: first game 
DBG 
Demand  Passive 
 
MB  (1,4)  
Refuse  Acquiesce    
 
DBG  (4,2)     
Aggressive Accepting      
 
(3,1)  (2,3)       
 This game is solved normally, by the actors excluding the less desirable outcome at 
each node from the bottom up. Solved, it looks like this:  
Figure 6.5: first game solved   DBG 
Demand  Passive 
 
MB  (1,4)  
Refuse  Acquiesce    
 
DBG  (4,2)     
Aggressive Accepting      
 
(3,1)  (2,3)       
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 First, Ben-Gurion chooses 3 over 2 in the final node. Going up a level on the tree, 
Begin chooses 2 over 1. On the first node, Ben-Gurion chooses 4 over 1 and the game is 
solved with Begin acquiescing to Ben-Gurion’s demands. The ordinal values for this 
outcome is (4,2).  
 But this isn’t what happened.  
 
6.6 Ben-Gurion’s Second Nature 
 To explain this discrepancy between the game and the historical events, we must 
either revise the payoff table or find some other explanation. To revise the payoff table 
would quickly become nonsensical, forcing us to assume that Begin through some death-
wish not consistent with his character actually wanted to confront the IDF while another war 
was going on. We have to look for another explanation, by looking at Begin’s assumptions 
concerning Ben-Gurion’s character.  
Ben-Gurion’s preferences in the above game show someone willing to face down the 
Irgun no matter the cost. However, both the crisis and Begin’s previous experience with 
Ben-Gurion could suggest other preferences. Ben-Gurion’s character from the first game can 
be called his “hard-liner” nature, and the one Begin expected to face “soft-liner” nature.  
 Regardless of nature, it is obvious that Ben-Gurion’s first preference would be for 
Begin to acquiesce to his demands.  
 The main point of interest is the preference value assigned to acting aggressive when 
faced with Begin’s refusal in the final node. As already described, this would not be an easy 
choice. The weapons were needed for the war, and would benefit the Yishuv no matter 
whose hands they were in. Confronting Begin could cost both him and the state dearly, as 
spending resources on internal struggle could lose the war and being seen as responsible for 
this would be politically disastrous even if Israel managed to survive. In addition, there was 
precedence to consider: the tradition of Yishuv non-violence was so strong that during the 
mandate, even with the Haganah arresting and detaining them in the “Season”, Irgun 
members would not fight other Jews. Begin had all reason to believe that this was still the 
case, and it would not be irrational to assume that this would be Ben-Gurion’s least preferred 
outcome.  
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 The two other outcomes, Ben-Gurion acting passive and accepting respectively, 
would likely stay in the same order and simply move up to second and third least preferred 
respectively as the aggressive option is inserted at the bottom of the scale.  
If we exchange Ben-Gurion’s “soft-liner” nature for his “hard-liner” one, we get the 
following payoff table: 
Figure 6.6: payoff table 2 
 DBG MB 
DBG passive 2 4 
MB acquiesce 4 2 
DBG aggressive 1 1 
DBG accepting 3 3 
 
6.7 The second game 
Inserting Ben-Gurion’s “soft-liner” payoff table instead of the “hard-liner” one, we 
get the following game. We can solve this immediately:  
Figure 6.7: second game solved   DBG 
Demand  Passive 
 
MB  (2,4)  
Refuse  Acquiesce    
 
DBG  (4,2)     
Aggressive Accepting      
 
(1,1)  (3,3)       
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 Working from the final node and up, Ben-Gurion chooses 3 over 1, Begin then 
chooses 3 over 2, and Ben-Gurion finally chooses 3 over 2 giving the outcome of Ben-
Gurion accepting Begin’s refusal for the ordinal values of (3,3).  
 Of course, this isn’t what happened either.  
 
6.8 The uncertain game 
 As already mentioned, this game is solved by introducing uncertainty. The question 
is whether or not Ben-Gurion has a hard-liner or soft-liner nature, his nature deciding his 
preferences and hence his responses to Begin’s actions. Obviously, for Begin, knowing Ben-
Gurion’s nature is a prerequisite to make optimal choices during the game. Unfortunately 
this knowledge is not available, and Begin is forced to consider the probabilities of each 
alternative nature.  
 Set together, the payoff tables from the two introductory games give us the following 
payoff table for the uncertainty game:  
 
Figure 6.8: uncertain game payoff table 
 DBGhard DBGsoft MB 
DBG passive  1 2 4 
MB acquiesce 4 4 2 
DBG aggressive 3 1 1 
DBG accepting 2 3 3 
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 Inserted into a single game structure with a Nature node, we get the following game 
tree:  
Figure 6.9: uncertain game tree 
DBGnature 
 
DBG     DBG 
Demand  Passive   Demand  Passive 
 
MB  (1,4)   MB  (2,4) 
Refuse  Acquiesce  Refuse  Acquiesce   
 
DBG  (4,2)   DBG  (4,2)     
Aggressive Accepting  Aggressive Accepting    
  
(3,1)  (2,3)   (1,1)  (3,3)      
 
 It is when Begin has to make his choice between refusing or acquiescing to Ben-
Gurion’s demands at the third node the uncertainty becomes central. Begin will have to 
calculate his expected payoffs for each of the two alternatives, in order to make an optimal 
choice. Of course, this depends on what he does not know for certain –Ben-Gurion’s nature.  
 Choosing acquiesce will yield the same result no matter what Ben-Gurion’s nature 
might be, an ordinal value of 2 as the game ends here.  
 Refusing, on the other hand, gives results depending on Ben-Gurion’s response. If 
he’s a hard-liner he’ll choose to act aggressively, giving Begin an ordinal value of 1. If he’s 
a soft-liner he’ll choose to accept, giving Begin an ordinal value of 3.  
 If (p) is the chance of Ben-Gurion being hard-liner and (1-p) is the chance of him 
being soft-liner, we get the following expected payoff (E) for Begin’s refusal:  
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 E = (p)a + (1-p)b 
 E = (p)1 + (1-p)3 
 E = p +  3 – 3p 
 E = 3 – 2p 
 
 The expected payoff for choosing refusal is 3 minus twice the chance of Ben-Gurion 
being a hard-liner. This makes sense, if there is no chance (0%) of this the expected payoff 
will be 3 – 2x0 = 3, and if it is certain (100%) the payoff will be 3 – 2x1 = 1.  
 Of course, this only shows the expected payoff for refusal, not whether or not it is the 
rational choice. This depends on the probability of Ben-Gurion being a hard-liner, or more 
specifically on the value of (p). For one to be the rational choice, the expected value (E) has 
to be higher than the outcome of the alternative. If there is no outcome with a higher value, 
there is an equilibrium. This is calculated thus:  
 
 3 – 2p = 2 | - 3  
 -2p = -1 | : -2 
 p = 0.5 
 
 As long as (p), the probability of Ben-Gurion being a hard-liner, is 0.5 or 50%, it is 
irrelevant what is chosen as the expected payoff for each choice is the same: 2. If (p) > 0.5 
then acquiescence becomes the rational choice, and if (p) < 0.5 then refusal becomes the 
rational choice.  
 From this, we see that which is the rational choice for Begin at this node depends on 
the value of (p), which is a subjective assessment of the character of the opposing player.  
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6.9 The uncertain game solved 
 Using the procedure above, the game can be solved to satisfaction without having to 
resort to revision of preferences.  
 Begin, remembering his own strong principles and beliefs regarding the unity of the 
Yishuv as well as precedence and the requirements of the ongoing war, believed that (p) < 
0.5 and the rational choice would therefore be to refuse Ben-Gurion’s demands as this would 
give him control over the shipment of weapons onboard the Altalena. It is of course difficult 
to estimate how low he actually believed (p) to be, but considering the stakes and his own 
statements after the events it is not impossible that he considered (p) ~ 0.  
 He was, as we know, mistaken. Ben-Gurion’s recollection of the Mandate-era 
rivalries might have been less rosy than Begin’s, and with the legitimacy of state authority 
on his side he was disinclined to concede anything. Also, as, the first prime minister in a 
newly-founded state the responsibilities must have weighed heavily, making him loath to 
accept any challenges to the state authority he was creating. Accepting an armed dissident 
group to establish itself in a position of power was unthinkable, and the rational choice was 
to confront them as necessary.  
Figure 6.10: uncertain game tree solved  DBGnature 
(p)   (1-p) 
DBG     DBG 
Demand  Passive   Demand  Passive 
 
MB  (1,4)   MB  (2,4) 
Refuse  Acquiesce  Refuse  Acquiesce   
 
DBG  (4,2)   DBG  (4,2)     
Aggressive Accepting  Aggressive Accepting    
  
(3,1)  (2,3)   (1,1)  (3,3)      
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 The result of Begin’s miscalculation and Ben-Gurion’s suspiciousness and 
belligerency was a significant number of Jewish casualties, the sinking of the Altalena and 
its cargo, and a deep divide within the Yishuv.  
 The less-than optimal outcome of the Altalena Game is reflected when the other tools 
are applied. The outcome of the game is not Pareto optimal within the hardliner-subgame or 
the game tree as a whole, because the payoff from Ben-Gurion demanding followed by 
Begin acquiescing would have better payoffs for both players in both subgames and in the 
softliner-subgame Ben-Gurion accepting would give a higher payoff for Begin and the same 
for Ben-Gurion. Obviously, when coupled with his miscalculation of the odds for Nature 
Begin’s hope for a Pareto optimal contributed to the outcome.  
 The game is not a Nash equilibrium, since the outcome does not result from the best 
responses being chosen. However, when the decision-making process is controlled for the 
actors’ beliefs and perceptions, the game is clearly a Bayes’ Perfect equilibrium as strategies 
are chosen based on them being perceived as the best responses at the time and the 
calamitous result for Begin results from him not receiving information with which to update 
his perceptions of Ben-Gurion’s nature before it is too late.  
 The game has been played on the extensive form, but as already mentioned it is 
useful to analyze the game in the static form as well.  
 
6.10 Altalena static game: 
Figure 6.11: static game 
 MB MB 
 Refuse Acquiesce Refuse Acquiesce 
Passive 1,4 1,4 2,4 2,4 
Demand/aggressive 3,1 4,2 1,1 4,2 
Demand/accepting 2,3 4,2 3,3 4,2 
DBG 
 Hardliner (p) Softliner (1-p) 
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 Looking for dominant strategies, it is immediately clear that Ben-Gurion does not 
have a dominant strategy for the game as a whole. He does, however, have weakly dominant 
strategies in the two subgames: Demand followed by aggressive in the hardliner subgame, 
and demand followed by accepting in the softliner subgame. This fits well with what Nature 
represents in this game –whether or not he is willing to back up his demands with force if 
necessary.  
 Begin, on the other hand, has no dominant strategy as his choices are heavily 
dependent upon Ben-Gurion’s strategy –and therefore on Begin’s perceptions of Nature, 
which again brings us to the core of the Altalena Game.  
 
6.11 Conclusions and aftermath 
 The Altalena affair is still a source of bitterness in Israel. Notwithstanding the 
casualties, there is a feeling among hard-liner Zionists that if Ben-Gurion’s actions had been 
otherwise Israel might have had a stronger position after the end of the war, holding more 
territory and possibly even preventing the next war in 1967. Supporters of Ben-Gurion point 
to the need for the government to be the supreme authority within its territory and to the 
Irgun’s breach of treaty undermining this authority.  
 There can be little doubt that the outcome was suboptimal for both actors, but that the 
Irgun and Begin got the worst of it. Begin escaped and would eventually become prime 
minister, but his authority within the Irgun and with its sympathizers was severely weakened 
because of his defeat. The treaty dissolving the Irgun’s militias and incorporating them into 
the IDF collapsed as the IDF was reluctant to trust Irgun troops who had deserted and even 
fired at them. A wave of arrests and confiscations of equipment followed, not exclusively of 
Irgun troops but also of senior Irgun members detained without trial (Sprinzak 1999: 30-31). 
Ben-Gurion, the government and the IDF would not accept any challenges to their authority 
and had scant trust for any dissidents at this point, and as a result the Irgun and its political 
successors would be marginalized for a long time.  
 Ben-Gurion also suffered negative results of the outcome. Non-Haganah cabinet 
members resigned over what they saw as an illegal and undemocratic course of actions, 
others opposed him fiercely. The resignations and opposition of members of the provisional 
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government damaged the legitimacy of Ben-Gurion’s leadership, and did divide the Yishuv 
in a time of crisis (Sprinzak 1999: 31-32). 
 The Altalena game is an example of actors making suboptimal choices because of 
incomplete information, and the key to the game is the uncertainty of Ben-Gurion’s nature. 
Because of this uncertainty, we can identify Begin’s actions as rational despite the outcome 
being sub-optimal. As we have seen, Begin’s flawed assessment of Ben-Gurion’s nature led 
to the least favourable outcome for him. However, as discussed above, all the considerations 
regarding the risk of the aggressive stance came to pass. The weapons were lost, the Yishuv 
and the government divided and the violence against other Jews hurt Ben-Gurion’s 
legitimacy. In hindsight, that most wonderful of abilities, Begin was mistaken but seeing the 
developments of the aftermath it is not difficult to understand how Begin, if he foresaw 
these, came to the conclusions he did. It is not a question of irrationality, but of 
misjudgement.  
 Ben-Gurion surely also saw the possibility of this aftermath. To him it must in fact 
have looked even bleaker, as he could not know that Begin and the Irgun would show as 
much restraint as they did when the conflict escalated and must have had to consider the 
possibilities of a real bloodbath. Even so, asserting the authority of the prime minister and 
the government took priority, leading to the outcome we know.  
 
7.0 The Labour epoch 1948-1977 
7.1 Labour governments 
 When the armistice talks were held in the early months of 1949 Israel had occupied 
significant territories in Palestine, leaving only the West Bank of the Jordan River and the 
old city of Jerusalem in Jordanian hands and Gaza under Egyptian control. The immediate 
problems facing the new state were those of safety and refugees –despite victory in the War 
of Independence, Israel was still outnumbered by its Arab neighbours and the war had led to 
a wave of Sephardic immigrants from the Arab states.  
In the elections to the Constituent Assembly, to become the first Knesset, David Ben-
Gurion’s Mapai list was clearly dominant with 35.6% of the votes (Knesset 2009). Together 
with the United Religious Front and a couple of minor parties they founded the first 
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government of Israel, a majority government with Ben-Gurion as Prime Minister. With only 
minor adjustments these same parties composed the second government. The work of 
integrating the Sephardic refugees from the Arab states and Ashkenazim immigrating with 
the end of the war and the lifting of the Mandate Authority’s restrictions began, as did the 
conversion of pre-state Yishuv institutions and economy into state institutions and economy. 
The minority of Palestinian Arabs who had not fled or been driven out were given political 
and social equality in the Declaration of Independence but, because of security concerns 
after over 20 years of armed conflict and the need to accommodate immigrants, found their 
movements restricted and land confiscated (Metz 1990: 99-102).  
 The elections to the Second Knesset in 1951 repeated Ben-Gurion’s success, giving 
Mapai 37.3% of the vote and allowing him to once again form a majority government with 
the component parties from the United Religious Front –Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael. The 
Second Knesset had four different government coalitions, with the third being dominated by 
Mapai and the centrist General Zionists party, the rest by Mapai and the religious parties. 
Except a brief stint as Defense Minister in 1955, Ben-Gurion remained Prime Minister 
(Knesset 2009).  
In the next three Knesset elections in 1955, 1959, 1961 and 1965, Mapai consistently 
got above 30% of the vote and built government coalitions with predominantly religious 
parties. In the six government coalitions during this period, Ben-Gurion remained Prime 
Minister until 1963 when he left the party and Levi Eshkol succeeded him. The Herut 
Movement, successor to the Irgun and the Stern gang, remained effectively politically 
marginalized despite consistently being the second largest party in the Knesset. This trend 
continued through the 1969 and 1973 elections, Mapai at this point having become the 
Labour Alignment and Herut becoming Gahal and then Likud. The Herut appeared in 
government during the Sixth and Seventh Knesset, first with two token ministers without 
portfolio in 1969 and later with ministers of Development, Postal Service, Trade and 
Industry, but Mapai and its successors kept the Prime Minister position and its most 
important coalition-building ally remained the religious parties. Golda Meir replaced Eshkol 
as Prime Minister in 1969 and was succeeded by Yitzhak Rabin in 1974 (Knesset 2009).  
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7.2 The Arab-Israeli wars if 1956, 1967 and 1973 
During this period, the conflict with the Arabs continued. In 1956 the IDF seized the 
Sinai from the Egyptians and the British and French occupied the Suez Canal to protect it –
from Nasser’s nationalization as much as from combat, but Soviet and US pressure forced 
withdrawal. Despite the end of the war low-grade hostilities continued and tensions rose. 
Following the Egyptian closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and termination of 
the UN peacekeeping force’s mandate in 1967, the IDF attacked Egyptian, Syrian and 
Jordanian forces. At the end of the Six-Day War, Israel had taken the strategically and 
agriculturally important Golan Heights from Syria, East Jerusalem and the West Bank from 
Jordan, and Sinai and Gaza from Egypt. The successful war was seen as a triumph for the 
IDF and by many Jews as the vindication of a no-longer oppressed people, but on the other 
side the Palestinian Arabs were radicalized by the occupation. Following the war, UN 
resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal in exchange for Arab recognition –a resolution 
that found little support on either side of the conflict (Metz 1990: 104-109).  
The ceasefire in 1967 did not end the war, and skirmishes continued. On October 6 
1973, during Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, Egyptian and Syrian troops 
launched a surprise attack on Israel. In the first days of the war the defenders suffered 
significant casualties and were pushed back on all fronts until, around October 10, the IDF 
rallied, surrounded the Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai and pushed into Egypt and Syria 
proper. Following US and Soviet material support and diplomatic action, the ceasefire was 
signed on October 25 (Metz 1990: 111-112).  
 
8.0 The Second Mahapac: The Mahapac Game, 1977 
8.1 The Yom Kippur War and its aftermath 
 When the smoke cleared, Israel had suffered heavy losses in manpower, equipment 
and financial costs. Most importantly, though, Israel’s self-image since as an unassailably 
strong regional power was severely shaken, and with it the national feeling of security and 
confidence (Metz 1990: 112). The blame for this national disaster, dubbed mechdal, blunder, 
was largely put on the ruling Labour Alignment, heir to Mapai and thus representing the 
political groups that had been in power since Israel’s independence.  
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 The elections for the Eighth Knesset were held on December 31, 1973, with the new 
Knesset in effect from March 10 the next year. With only a two-month gap between the end 
of hostilities and the elections, there was no opportunity for new parties to form and submit 
lists for the elections to the election authorities, and the existing parties chose not to change 
the lists submitted before the war. Although public and political analysis and critique of the 
handling of the war began in the immediate aftermath, because of the upcoming Geneva 
Conference and the short time span between events the political impact of the mechdal on 
the 1973 elections was limited (Penniman 1979: 133-36) and Labour’s Golda Meir formed a 
new government. It was, however, not forgotten and would remain part of the political 
debate until it returned with a vengeance in 1977.  
 Following the power struggle of the Mandate period, climaxing with the Altalena 
affair of 1948, the Haganah and its political successor Mapai (which merged with other 
parties and became Labour in 1968) had, at the time of the 1977 elections, held power in 
Israel continuously since independence. There can be little doubt that the party suffered from 
a degree of “governing sickness” at this point. The important factor, however, would be 
whether or not the Labour supporters’ disenchantment was strong enough to allow them to 
vote for a competing party –the Likud.  
 
8.2 The Labour Alignment 
 The near 30 years of Labour dominance had had a profound effect. The statism 
advocated by Ben-Gurion et al from the early days had prevailed, leading to centralized 
welfare and immigration support services that made many of the party-based services 
redundant. Haganah and the Jewish Agency had traditionally been the strongest providers of 
such services, and so this development gradually lost the parties, especially the leftist parties, 
their tools for support- and identity-building from the pre-state era. As immigration and the 
passage of time included more voters without such service-strengthened party identities in 
the electorate, Labour’s support base eroded (Penniman 1979: 119-123, 289-293).  
 Related to this, the role of ideology on the political left had changed. While Mapai 
and its descendants were socialist-secular parties, their political dominance during the state-
building period tended to put ideology second to political pragmatism. This often distanced 
the party leadership from both the party machine and the leftist electorate, and as importantly 
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reduced the ideological profile of the party compared to that of its rivals, especially the 
Likud (Penniman 1979: 301-302, 119-123). One of the ideological compromises made was 
the lack of prioritization of reducing the income gap between Sephardim and Ashkenazim 
(Metz 1990: 116), which also alienated the Sephardim and increased support for the Likud. 
The lack of ideological profile was to be important, as we shall see.  
 Perhaps the most important problem following the years of Labour dominance was 
the perceived lack of responsiveness from the party elite. The nomination process for the 
Knesset elections lists was done through a committee appointed by the party leadership, and 
for the 1973 elections this committee was even headed by the Finance Minister. Although 
the lists were passed through the party’s Central Committee, this vote was largely 
ceremonial. As a result of this process, Mapai’s and its heirs’ Knesset representation was 
largely composed of party members loyal to and with views similar to the party elite, 
insulating them from changes of opinion in the party membership and thus in the electorate. 
The Standing Committee of the Central Committee was the result of a similar process, being 
nominated by the party leadership and the most important party sub-divisions, and as a result 
had the same lack of independence as the Knesset members (Penniman 1979: 125-129). 
With the most high-profile members of the party being dependent upon their seniors it can 
not be surprising that these members tended to share the same views and therefore, through 
this process of self-recruiting, the party’s responsiveness to the public was severely limited.  
 The conflict between the party and the elite was, however, not limited to between the 
leadership and the mass of party members. The abovementioned workings made patronage 
by a senior party member the only likely path to advancement, however the mid-level party 
members would often find themselves bypassed as the leadership considered them loyal 
supporters anyway and instead ‘parachuted’ high-profile individuals, especially from the 
military, into positions of power and prestige in order to appeal to the electorate. One such 
was former IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, who replaced Prime Minister Golda Meir 
when she resigned from a combination of public dissatisfaction and party pressure in 1974. 
This tactic may well have worked, but alienated their mid-level supporters while putting 
inexperienced politicians into positions of power, increasing the internal stress on the party 
and leading to the split of Ben-Gurion and the Rafi party from Mapai in 1965 (Penniman 
1979: 136-138, 293-300).  
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 In addition to the perceived lack of responsiveness and the internal dissent, charges 
of corruption and incompetence were levelled against the party, peaking with Histadrut’s 
health service director Asher Yadlin, Labour’s nominee for the governorship of the Bank of 
Israel, was jailed for corruption and tax evasion only a few weeks after the suicide of Labour 
Minister of Housing Avraham Ofer who was under investigation for the same, and only 
shortly before Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin became involved in an investigation of illegal 
foreign bank accounts (Metz 1990: 115, Penniman 1979: 142-144). The resulting scandal 
obviously raised suspicions of how far the corruption went and was sure to hurt the image of 
the ruling party in the period preceding the 1977 elections.  
 
8.3 The internal power struggle and the Knesset elections 
 In the run-up to the 1977 elections, pressure for reform increased in the Labour party 
as the party leadership, being the second generation of Israeli statesmen and to a significant 
degree ‘parachuted’ into power, lacked the legitimacy of the earlier leadership of the time of 
the Declaration of Independence. The exclusion from power of the majority of the party 
machine and the probable damage to the party’s electability from the perceived corruption 
and unresponsiveness prompted demands for changes to the party’s democracy and power 
structure, damaging party cohesion.  
 At the same time, the Likud had been gaining in popularity because of Labour’s 
problems and because of its appeal to disenchanted groups in the lower social and economic 
strata who had not seen their standards of living increase as expected –especially the 
Sephardim (Metz 1990: 114-116, Penniman 1979: 101-102). Also, having been in opposition 
for most of the time since independence, excepting a short period as junior partner in a 
Labour government, the Likud did not suffer from “governing sickness” and could present 
itself as a fresh, non-corrupt and responsive alternative.  
 Despite its “freshness”, though, Menachem Begin’s Likud had problems of its own in 
Labour’s eyes. Despite the time that had passed, the clash over the Altalena was not 
forgotten and Begin was distrusted by many. Israel’s situation in the Middle East was still 
considered precarious by many, and while this caused dissatisfaction with the ruling party it 
also gave incentive to avoid potentially dangerous political experimentation. Yadlin’s 
statement from October 1973 still rang true to many Labour members: “The people will be 
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wise. When the time comes for them to vote, they will vote correctly” (Penniman 1979: 
133).  
 The Labour elite trusted in the inertia of the political system, especially in the face of 
continuing external threats, and rejected demands for party reform prior to the 1977 
elections. As a result, the party went to elections without a united front, without a clear 
policy and without seeming to take responsibility for voter dissatisfaction while the Likud 
managed to appear trustworthy and responsive in comparison. To make matters worse for 
Labour the National Religious Party was dissatisfied with its performance in the previous 
election and anxious to distance itself from the ruling party. This left the government without 
a majority in Knesset and forced the elections to be moved from the autumn of 1977 to May, 
giving Labour less time to distance itself from the corruption scandals that had plagued it 
(Penniman 1979: 102-104). In addition to this, the party made two strategic blunders in the 
period leading up to the elections. First, unlike previous elections the elections for the labour 
organization Histadrut were held after the Knesset elections instead of before and did 
therefore not give the electorate an option for protest voting that did not affect the Knesset. 
Also, the elections for the municipal councils were separated from the Knesset elections, 
which compounded the problem of lacking party unity. As local representatives were no 
longer campaigning for the national elections and their own position simultaneously, their 
efforts in favour of a party leadership many felt alienated from were significantly reduced 
(Penniman 1979: 142-144).  
 The combination of public dissatisfaction, a surprisingly strong Likud and a divided 
Labour led to the mahapac –Labour’s first electoral defeat in Israeli history, and the 
beginning of the Likud era.  
 
8.4 Aftermath 
 In the elections to the ninth Knesset on May 17. 1977, the Likud got 33.4% of the 
vote while the Labour Alignment got 24.6%. This meant a total of 43 seats for the Likud, 
and 32 seats for Labour. Comparing this to the results of the 1973 elections, where Likud 
received 30.2% and 39 seats and Labour 39.6% and 51 seats, there has been an obvious 
change in electoral support (Knesset 2009).  
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 After the election, Menachem Begin became Prime Minister and went on to form one 
the second government of Israel that lasted for the full four-year term together with the NRP 
and the Democratic Movement for Change. Despite Labour’s participation in the ‘National 
Unity’-governments during the twelfth Knesset 1984-88 and a return to power in 1992, the 
Likud would remain the dominant party in the Knesset for most of the next 29 years 
(Knesset 2009).  
 
8.5 The Mahapac game 
 From the above chronology, it is possible to construct a game to analyze the actions 
that eventually led to the end of the Labour dominance of Israeli politics.  
 One actor is the Labour Elite, the leadership of the party and the majority of its 
candidates for Knesset and minister posts. This group consists largely of early immigrants, 
old Haganah members as well as the high-profile outsiders ‘parachuted’ in. The 
centralization of power in the Labour party leaves this group with the final say in party 
policy and nomination. The choices made by Labour before the 1977 elections are the 
choices of the Labour Elite.  
 The other actor is the Labour party machine, the mid-level party members who would 
be the heirs to the “party throne” were it not for their patrons’ tendency to bring in outsiders 
in positions of power. Because of the centralization of power, this group is less powerful 
than their numbers would imply. This and the habit of ‘parachuting’ are sources of 
dissatisfaction. The weakening of Labour popularity among the electorate is reason for 
concern. This group is called the Reformers.  
 Although the Likud defeated the Labour party in the polls, the 1977 game is not 
played between the Labour party elite and the Likud because their actions in and before the 
election campaign were largely independent of each other. The Likud denounced the 
governing party as corrupt and arrogant and sought to portray itself as a safe alternative, 
while Labour insisted that it was the only viable ruling party. Instead, the game is played 
over Labour’s internal problems while the Likud will have a different role in the game. 
 Because the game is played between the haves and the have-nots of Labour, the first 
node should belong to those unhappy with the status quo. The Elite is, after all, in charge of 
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the party and has little incentive to push for changes. The Reformers, on the other hand, are 
marginalized and would benefit from party reform. The first actor, then, is the Reformers. 
They have two options: to cooperate with the party Elite, or demand reforms. These 
strategies are called ‘Cooperate’ and ‘Demand’. Choosing ‘Cooperate’ would mean avoiding 
internal conflict in favour of a united front. This would mean reducing the pressure on the 
Elite and thus their incentive to effect reforms that would benefit the Reformers and possibly 
the party as a whole. On the other hand, ‘Cooperate’ would hopefully reduce the public 
attention to the party’s structural problems and thus increase its electability, and give the 
party a smoother-running campaign machine in the upcoming elections. Either way, the 
Reformers choosing ‘Cooperate’ would end the game early without significant changes to 
the party structure and with a united front. ‘Demand’, on the other hand, would mean 
increasing the internal pressure for reforms at the cost of party unity and would take the 
game to the next node.  
 In the second node, the Reformers have chosen ‘Demand’ and the Elite have to 
choose how to respond. There are two possible strategies. One is to give in to the demands 
and make changes to the party power structure in an attempt to reunite the party as well as 
increase its perceived responsiveness to public opinion. This would, however, reduce the 
power of the Elite in the party and therefore in Israeli politics. Considering this was what 
ensured the political career of many of the party Elite, the personal costs in surrendering 
power could be significant even if it meant giving the party a better electoral outcome. This 
strategy is called ‘Give In’. The other would be to ignore the demands, hoping that the 
conservatism of the electorate and the party loyalty of the party machinery would ensure a 
continued dominance of the Knesset. This would have the obvious benefit of not requiring 
any surrender of power, letting the Elite continue their dominance of the party but risking a 
loss in the Knesset elections because of a lack of party unity and voter dissatisfaction. This 
strategy is called ‘Ignore’. Either strategy will end the game, leading Labour to face the 1977 
Knesset elections with either increased cooperation between the party leadership and the 
party machine as well as an improved public profile or without significant changes but 
without reducing the internal dominance of the Elite, respectively.  
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 In its simplest form, then, the 1977 game looks like this:  
Figure 8.1: simple game tree 
Reformers 
Cooperate Demand 
 
Elite 
Give In  Ignore 
 
 
8.6 Preferences  
 To solve the game, the game tree itself is not sufficient. We need to identify the 
preferences of the actors. Looking at the game three and the different outcomes, this seems 
reasonably straightforward. With three possible outcomes, the actors’ preferences will be 
given ordinal values of 1-3, with 3 being the most preferred outcome.  
 For the Reformers, the obvious preferred outcome would be to choose ‘Demand’ and 
have the Elite choose ‘Give in’. This would give them a more powerful position within the 
party as well as hopefully increasing Labour’s chances in the Knesset elections. This 
outcome will be given an ordinal value of 3.  
 The second most preferred outcome for the Reformers would be ending the game 
early by choosing ‘Cooperate’. This is obviously an inferior outcome to actual reforms, as it 
will perpetuate the status quo and give no internal party benefits. However, this outcome 
would at least preserve party unity before the Knesset elections, hopefully reducing public 
attention to the internal party problems as well as the perceived lack of responsiveness. 
Labour doing well in elections must be considered a benefit for the Reformers as well as the 
Elite, and this outcome will therefore be given an ordinal value of 2.  
The least preferred outcome would be choosing ‘Demand’ followed by the Elite 
choosing ‘Ignore’. This would not only mean no favourable changes to the party structure, 
but in addition the internal power struggle as well as the attention it would likely draw would 
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weaken the party before the Knesset elections, to the detriment of both actors. This outcome 
will be given an ordinal value of 1.  
Regarding the Elite, the most preferred outcome is obviously the Reformers ending 
the game early by choosing ‘Cooperate’. As the dominant group in the party and 
subsequently in Israeli politics, the status quo must be seen as favourable and the lack of 
internal power struggle would mean a better position for the party in the elections. This 
outcome obviously receives an ordinal value of 3.  
Ranking the remaining two outcomes though, namely the Reformers choosing 
‘Demand’ and the Elite responding with ‘Ignore’ or ‘Give In’, is more problematic because 
it depends on the electorate’s perception of the Likud. The question is whether or not the 
leading opposition party is considered a safe alternative or a dangerous experiment. At this 
point, it is necessary to introduce Nature to the game.  
 
8.7 Introducing Nature 
 As discussed, one of Labour’s political advantages, and one of the reasons for the 
political inertia in the Israeli political system, was the status of the Likud. The Likud lacked 
the close ties to the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut labour organization Labour enjoyed, 
and therefore did not have dependents or loyal institutions that could be counted on as 
political supporters to the same degree. It was the party of Menachem Begin and the Irgun, 
and therefore guilty of the challenge to the authority of the WZO and later the newly 
independent state culminating in the Altalena affair and the corresponding power struggle. 
Perhaps as importantly, the Likud had no governing experience whereas Labour had 
successfully, despite the 1973 mechdal, kept Israel standing through nearly 30 years of war 
with the Arab states. For these reasons, many Israelis and, more importantly, many 
prominent Labour leaders did not consider the Likud a responsible governing party and 
therefore not a ‘safe’ choice for the electorate –and correspondingly not a true threat to 
Labour’s dominance.  
 On the other hand, as already discussed, the Likud enjoyed quite a few benefits. It did 
not suffer from “governing sickness” or corruption scandals, it was blameless for the 
problems of the Yom Kippur War, and it attracted a demographic dissatisfied with Labour’s 
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economic policies. It had also grown significantly from the number of seats its predecessor 
lists had received in earlier Knesset elections, and with the increasing statism the loyalty of 
Labour’s dependent electorate was reduced. With these developments as well as the 
increasingly vocal voter dissatisfaction with the Labour government, the Likud could well be 
considered a ‘safe’ choice and therefore a true challenger in the run-up to the 1977 elections.  
 That the Likud was gathering support while the Labour party was losing it can not 
have been in doubt to any Israeli politician at the time, and it would be a continuation of the 
trend from the previous two elections. The question would be the degree of support the 
Likud would get at Labour’s expense. This was, of course, unknown before the elections but 
it would still determine the payoffs from the Elite’s strategies. 
 If the Likud was not considered a ‘safe’ choice by the plurality of Israeli voters, the 
Elite could safely ignore the demands for reform and keep the favourable party structure as 
the electorate would still rally to the party despite internal conflicts and negative perceptions. 
A united front would be preferable, but with little risk of losing power regardless of choice 
of strategy choosing ‘Ignore’ would be preferable to ‘Give In’ because it would not mean 
giving up privileges and internal dominance for little gain. ‘Ignore’ would therefore have an 
ordinal value of 2. ‘Give In’, on the other hand, would mean needlessly losing some control 
over the party, as an ‘unsafe’ Likud would not be able to truly challenge Labour. Losing 
power in the party without real benefits would have an ordinal value of 1.  
 If, however, Likud was considered a ‘safe’ choice for governing party, preferences 
would change. Internal conflict and increased attention to Labour’s problems would most 
likely result in an electoral loss, which could be disastrous for a party dependent on inertia, 
dependents and institutional support for its electoral victories. Losing personal privileges and 
power would be preferable for the Elite to the party losing political dominance, as this would 
risk political marginalization which would have a higher cost than a restructuring of power 
within the party. In this case, ‘Give In’ and subsequent party reforms, party unity and a 
likely improved Knesset elections performance would be a more preferable strategy while 
‘Ignore’ would, despite having obvious benefits internally, be costly in the Knesset elections. 
If the Likud was a ‘safe’ choice, ‘Give in’ would be given an ordinal value of 2 and ‘Ignore’ 
an ordinal value of 1.  
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 Considering the Elite’s differing payoffs between the two subgames, we get the 
following payoff table:  
Figure 8.2: payoff table 
 Reformers Elite Reformers Elite 
Cooperate 2 3 2 3 
Demand-Give In 3 1 3 2 
Demand-Ignore 1 2 1 1 
 Unsafe (p) Safe (1-p) 
 The Likud’s uncertain nature is at the heart of the 1977 game, and will be represented 
through the Nature node. This node divides the game into two separate game trees from the 
start. The two possible strategies in the Nature node are called ‘unsafe’ and ‘safe’. ‘Unsafe’ 
will be given a probability of (p), and ‘safe’ a probability of (1-p). This gives a combined 
probability for the two strategies of 1, recalculated to 100%, because there are no other 
possible strategies. The Likud is a safe choice, or it is not. The question, of course, is how 
high the actors consider the respective probabilities to be.  
 Introducing the Nature node and including the above payoffs, we get the full game 
tree of the 1977 game:  
Figure 8.3: full game tree   Nature 
Unsafe (p) Safe (1-p) 
 
Reformers   Reformers 
Cooperate Demand  Cooperate Demand 
 
(2,3)  Elite  (2,3)  Elite 
Give In Ignore   Give In Ignore 
 
(3,1)  (1,2)  (3,2)  (1,1) 
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8.8 Solving the game 
 The Mahapac Game is played on the extended form and is therefore solved by 
backwards induction. To begin, we will solve the two subgames separately.  
 
8.8.1The ‘unsafe’ subgame 
 If the Likud is considered to be ‘unsafe’, assuming the game progresses to its final 
node the Elite will have the choice between a strategy of ‘Ignore’, for a payoff of 2, or a 
strategy of ‘Give In’, for a payoff of 1. Given these payoffs, they will obviously choose 
‘Ignore’ for the higher payoff.  
 There is no reason to assume that the Reformers, knowing full well what the stakes of 
the game were and including experienced politicians among their number, would not be 
aware of the preferences and likely actions of the Elite. If the Elite is going to choose 
‘Ignore’ when faced with a strategy of ‘Demand’, the outcome will have a payoff of 1 for the 
Reformers. The alternative is to end the game early by choosing ‘Cooperate’ for a payoff of 
2. With the Likud considered no real threat there is little incentive for the party leadership to 
give in to demands and a strategy of ‘Demand’ will likely only serve to weaken the party’s 
Knesset representation with no real return. If the Likud is ‘unsafe’, then, the Reformers’ best 
strategy is to end the game early and choose ‘Cooperate’. This gives us the following 
subgame tree:  
Figure 8.4: unsafe subgame solved 
Reformers 
Cooperate Demand 
 
(2,3)  Elite     
Give In  Ignore 
 
 (3,1)  (1,2) 
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If the Likud is not considered a threat, the outcome of the game would be the 
Reformers choosing ‘Cooperate’ and ending the game early with a payoff of (2,3). However, 
this is not what happened.  
 
8.8.2 The ‘safe’ subgame 
 If the Likud is considered ‘safe’, and assuming the game progresses to its final node, 
the Elite will have different preferences. Faced with the choice between surrendering power 
in the party, ‘Give In’, or risk losing dominance in the Knesset, ‘Ignore’, ‘Give In’ in to the 
demands of the Reformers will be the more preferable strategy with a payoff of 2 compared 
to a payoff of 1 for ‘Ignore’.  
 Again assuming perfect knowledge of their opponents’ preferences, in the first node 
the Reformers are faced with a payoff of 3 from the strategy of ‘Demand’. The alternative 
strategy of ‘Cooperate’ will have a payoff of 2. With the Likud considered a real challenge 
to Labour’s dominance, then, blackmail in the form of demands for reform is likely to work. 
The rational choice would therefore be ‘Demand’, giving the following subgame tree:  
Figure 8.5: safe subgame solved 
Reformers 
Cooperate Demand 
 
(2,3)  Elite     
Give In  Ignore 
 
 (3,1)  (1,2) 
 
 If the Likud is considered a threat, the outcome of the game will be the Reformers 
choosing ‘Demand’ in the first node and the Elite responding with ‘Give In’, for a payoff of 
(3,2). Of course, this is not what happened either.  
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8.9 Expected payoffs 
 As we have seen, the payoffs from the different strategies vary depending on the 
Nature of the Likud –its electability. With Nature being unknown to the actors at the time of 
the game, as it is played before the Knesset elections, the players have to make their choices 
on their perception of Nature and, as importantly, their belief regarding their opponents’ 
perceptions.  
 The probabilities of the two strategies in the Nature node are (p) for ‘unsafe’ and (1-
p) for ‘safe’. When making their choices, then, each actor will have to ascribe (p) a value 
from 0 to 1 and thereby give the two strategies a combined probability of 1. The higher the 
probability of a strategy, the stronger is the actors’ belief in that strategy being chosen –in 
the Likud’s nature being one or the other. 
 With the probabilities for Nature we are able to calculate the expected payoffs from a 
strategy being chosen. This is done through the following equation:  
E = (p)a + (1-p)b 
 E is the expected payoff for the strategy, (p) is the probability of the first outcome in 
the Nature node and (a) is the corresponding payoff of the strategy, (1-p) is the probability of 
the second outcome in the Nature node and (b) is the corresponding payoff. 
 Using this equation, we can find the expected payoffs for the different strategies of 
the two actors.  
 For the Elite, the expected payoff for choosing ‘Give In’ is as follows:  
E =  (p)1 + (1-p)2 
E = p + 2 – 2p 
E = 2 – p 
 As we can see, the higher the probability of Likud being ‘unsafe’ the lower the 
payoff for choosing ‘Give In’.  
 For the Elite, the expected payoff for choosing ‘Ignore’ is as follows:  
E = (p)2 + (1-p)1 
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E = 2p + 1 – p  
E = 1 + p 
 Unsurprisingly, the payoff for choosing ‘Ignore’ increases as the probability of Likud 
being ‘unsafe’ does.  
 Using these equations we can identify the cut-off points for the strategies, at which 
value of (p) one strategy becomes superior to the other. By combining the equations we 
calculate the value for (p) at the expected payoffs are the same:  
1 + p = 2 – p 
p + p = 2 – 1 
2p = 1  |:2 
p = 0.5 
 If (p) = 0.5, then, choosing ‘Give In’ or ‘Ignore’ is equally beneficial, if (p) > 0.5 
‘Ignore’ is the rational choice and if (p) < 0.5 ‘Give In’ is the rational choice. In sum, if the 
Elite believe there to be more than 50% chance for the Likud to be a serious electoral threat 
then they will choose ‘Give In’, if it is less than 50% they will choose ‘Ignore’.  
 For the Reformers, the calculations are essentially the same, with one important 
difference. Because the Reformers’ payoff from the ‘Demand’ strategy is dependent upon 
the strategy chosen by the Elite, it is dependent on the Elite’s perception of (p) rather than 
the Reformers’. This could be solved through the introduction of a second Nature node 
representing the optimism of the Elite, but this is unnecessarily complicated. Both groups 
include experienced politicians from the same party, many with similar political 
backgrounds, and they will have access to the same information regarding the Likud’s 
election campaign plans and position in the polls. The Reformers’ therefore have every 
reason to expect the Elite to make a calculation similar to their own, and the Reformers’ 
evaluation of the uncertainty of the Nature node can therefore include the position of the 
Elite. The outcome of Nature will not, after all, become evident until after the end of the 
game.  
 Like the Elite, the Reformers have to strategies available. The payoff of the first 
strategy, ‘Cooperate’, is independent of the value of (p) and need to be calculated. The 
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payoff from the second strategy, ‘Demand’, can be calculated through the same equation as 
above. The difference in approach is that the payoffs are dependent upon the Elite’s 
perception of Nature. As we saw in the solved subgames, if the Elite believes the outcome of 
the Nature node to be ‘unsafe’ they will choose ‘Ignore’ for which the payoff for the 
Reformers is 1. If, however, they believe the outcome to be ‘safe’ they will choose ‘Give In’, 
with a payoff of 3 for the Reformers. This gives us the following equation:  
E = (p)1 + (1-p)3 
E = p + 3 – 3p 
E = 3 – 2p 
 The expected payoff from the ‘Demand’ strategy for the Reformers is, as we can see, 
higher the lower (p) is.  
 In order to calculate the cut-off value of (p) for the Reformers, we get the following 
equation:  
2 = 3 – 2p 
2p = 3 – 2 
2p = 1  |:2 
p = 0.5 
 So, if (p) = 0.5 the strategies are equal. If (p) > 0.5 the rational choice is ‘Cooperate’, 
and if (p) < 0.5 the rational choice is ‘Demand’.  
 Having solved the two subgames and calculated the expected payoffs, we can now 
solve the Mahapac Game.  
 
8.10 Solving the Mahapac Game 
 The outcome of the Nature node was ‘Safe’. When faced with the choice between the 
strategies of ‘Cooperate’ and ‘Demand’ the Reformers chose ‘Demand’. The Elite responded 
with ‘Ignore’, giving the least preferred outcome for both actors. Assuming rational 
behaviour, how is this possible? 
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Figure 8.6: full game solved 
Nature 
Unsafe (p) Safe (1-p) 
 
Reformers   Reformers 
Cooperate Demand  Cooperate Demand 
 
(2,3)  Elite  (2,3)  Elite 
Give In Ignore   Give In Ignore 
 
(3,1)  (1,2)  (3,2)  (1,1) 
 
 The outcome is ‘Ignore’ with the payoffs (1,1). It is by no means a Pareto optimal 
outcome as it could not, in fact, have turned out worse for either. It is, however, a Bayes’ 
Perfect equilibrium as despite the unfavourable outcome the strategies chosen do represent 
the best responses given the actors’ perceptions of Nature.  
It is in these perceptions of Nature that the explanation for the outcome can be found. 
The outcome of the Nature node, though possibly obvious in hindsight, was unknown to 
both actors at the time. Hence, they were forced to face uncertainty and calculate expected 
payoffs when choosing their strategies.  
When faced with the choice of ‘Cooperate’ or ‘Demand’ the Reformers chose 
‘Demand’, obviously believing (p) or, at least, the Elite’s perception of (p), to be no higher 
than 0.5. Put another way, the possibility of the Likud being a serious threat to the Labour 
party’s position was believed to be at least 50%.  
The Elite, when faced with ‘Demand’ and quite possibly rather surprised by the 
developments, chose ‘Ignore’ reflecting their beliefs that the threat could not be more than 
50% at most, with (p) of at least 0.5.  
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Before we conclude the Mahapac Game, we will seek to identify any dominant 
strategies. This will be done in static form, by identifying the outcomes ending the game and 
their respective payoffs. As no actor has more than one choice that will allow the game to 
continue, the static game is a simple one: 
Figure 8.7: static game 
 Elite 
 Demand-Give In Demand-Ignore Demand-Give In Demand-Ignore 
Cooperate 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 
Demand 3,1 1,2 3,2 1,1 
 
 
Reformers 
 (p) Unsafe (1-p) Safe 
 
 As we can see, the Reformers have no dominant strategy. Regardless of Nature, their 
payoffs from ‘Demand’ are dependent upon the Elite’s response.  
 The Elite have no dominant strategy in the game as a whole. However, they do have 
weakly dominant strategies in the two Nature subgames. In the case of ‘Unsafe’, ‘Ignore’ 
will give as good or better payoffs as ‘Give In’, and in the case of ‘Safe’ ‘Give In’ will give 
as good or higher payoffs as ‘Ignore’. The differences are hardly surprising given how, as we 
have seen, the two outcomes of the Nature node affect the payoffs.   
 
8.11 Conclusions and aftermath 
The Reformers made their choice expecting a payoff of 3, with the Elite giving in to 
their demands rather than facing a potentially dangerous rival with a divided party. The Elite, 
on the other hand, chose their strategy expecting a payoff of 2, willing to accept internal 
dissent in order to keep their positions as the opposition was not perceived as any real threat. 
In this, it turned out, they were wrong, and the Likud were in the end considered a safe 
governing party by 33.4% of the electorate. Labour, on the other hand, faced the elections 
without a united front and without the reforms that could have redeemed its tarnished image. 
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The party ended with 24.6% of the votes, a seemingly strong result but disastrous compared 
to 39.6% in 1973 and 46.2% in 1969 (Knesset 2009).  
The result of the Mahapac Game stems from a dual miscalculation. The Reformers, 
though in hindsight correct about the Likud’s electability did not correctly estimate the 
Elite’s perceptions on the matter. These very perceptions, as they actually were, were wrong 
and the strategy based on them ended the game with the very low ordinal values of (1,1) –in 
hindsight the worst possible outcome for both. If the Reformers had estimated the Elite 
correctly (or, ironically, the electability of the Likud incorrectly), the game would have 
ended early with ‘Cooperate’ and leave the party with a united front. If the Elite, when 
challenged, had understood the actual outcome of the Nature node they would likely have 
chosen to instigate reforms and thereby unite the party and improve its image among the 
electorate. Either of these would likely have improved Labour’s performance in the 1977 
Knesset election, and even if not victorious the party would have had a stronger position in 
opposition.  
The outcome of the 1977 elections did not result only from the choices made in the 
internal power struggle of the Labour party. Incompetence, “governing sickness”, increasing 
statism and scandals all played their part, as did the successful Likud campaign and the fact 
that a lot of time had passed since the heated conflicts of the Mandate era. The power 
struggle was, however, undoubtedly the last chance the Labour party had to turn their 
fortunes around, and due to lack of understanding of the changing political climate they 
failed to do so. For the next 29 years, the Likud would be the dominant party.  
 
9.0 The Likud Era 
9.1 The Begin years 
 Menachem Begin’s ascension to power meant a prime minister with a background as 
a hardliner in Arab-Israeli relations, who believed that the territories in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem occupied in the 1967 war should be incorporated into Israel proper and who 
expressed readiness to defy even the United States if demands that threatened Israel’s 
interests were made. He did, as a result, oppose the planned Geneva conference on the Arab-
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Israeli conflict as a hostile forum that would seek to impose demands on Israel (Metz 1990: 
117-118). He was not the only one hostile to the conference.  
 In November 1977 Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt after the death of Nasser, took 
the unprecedented diplomatic step of travelling to Israel to address the Knesset. Fearing that 
an international conference would sacrifice the occupied Egyptian territories to facilitate 
solving the Palestinian problem and possibly the return of Syrian territory, he sought to pre-
empt through a bilateral agreement. Despite Begin’s reservations on surrendering territories, 
he eventually agreed. The 1978 Camp David agreement traded the Sinai for guaranteed 
Israeli shipping access through the Suez Canal and the straits of Tiran, and effectively 
removed the arguably strongest Arab state from the Arab-Israeli conflict through a peace 
treaty (Metz 1990: 118-120).  
 Following the ejection of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan in 1970, 
it established itself in Lebanon and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict upset the already fragile 
political balance. Civil war broke out in 1975, quickly followed by Syrian invention and the 
disintegration of the state into areas under control of the sectarian militias, including the 
PLO. In 1978, in a bid to end PLO incursions and isolate the West Bank to prepare that 
occupied territory for annexation, Begin ordered the invasion of Southern Lebanon. The 
invasion failed to eliminate the PLO, and the United Nations forces installed shortly after 
was an insufficient buffer. Learning from this mistake and increasingly worried over the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon, Begin made an alliance with the Maronite faction in an attempt 
to establish a stable, friendly regime. On June 6. 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again, this 
time reaching Beirut. After heavy civilian casualties an agreement was reached that would 
call for the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon. The Maronite Bashir Gemayel became 
president in August but assassinated shortly afterwards, unravelling the alliance and 
returning Lebanon to chaos. In 1983 the IDF withdrew from Lebanon except a buffer zone in 
the South where they would remain until Labour Prime Minister Ehud Barak withdrew the 
last forces in 2000. The same year, Menachem Begin resigned from political life as a result 
of the failed Lebanon war (Cleveland 2000: 372-379). He was replaced by Yitzhak Shamir, 
also from the Likud.  
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9.2 The Palestinian Intifadas and the peace process 
 The 1984 elections and the Lebanon debacle led to increased support for minority 
parties, and as a result Labour and the Likud formed a ‘National Unity’ government and 
shared the Prime Minister’s post. The 1988 elections saw the Likud return to dominance, 
though with Labour participation in government for part of the term.  
  Likud policies had led to an increase of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, 
which increased tension between Israel and the Palestinians. As a result, the first Palestinian 
Intifada broke out in December 1987. The widespread protests against Israeli occupation 
began as largely nonviolent, but violence increased over time (Cleveland 2000: 458-462). 
 In 1992, Labour won the elections and Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister. 
During this term Arab-Israeli negotiations led to the Oslo Agreement in 1993, which 
outlined a five-year program of Israeli withdrawal and increasing Palestinian autonomy, 
leading to a final peace treaty. However, bombs by the Hamas and religious Zionist 
protestation, leading to the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, slowed the process down 
until it ground to a halt with the return to power of the Likud under Binyamin Netanyahu in 
1996. (Cleveland 2000: 483-499). The Oslo Agreement finally collapsed with the Second 
Intifada in the early 2000s.  
 In 1999 Ehud Barak and Labour returned to power on a promise to end the costly 
occupation of Lebanon, which they did. His government collapsed before the term ended, 
and Ariel Sharon of the Likud became Prime Minister, a post he managed to retain in the 
2003 elections.  
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10.0 The Third Mahapac: The Kadima Game, 2005 
10.1 Before the schism 
 After the 1967 Six Day War, security issues replaced socio-economy as the dominant 
cleavage in Israeli politics and the main divide between the left and the right (Sandler 2008: 
42), as the conflict awakened the sleeping Zionist cleavage. In the 16th Knesset, the left was 
dominated by Labour and the right by the Likud, with the polarization of the Israeli party 
system precluding the establishment of a strong political centre (Sandler 2008: 43).  
 The Prime Minister during the 16th Knesset was Ariel Sharon of the Likud, who 
replaced Binyamin Netanyahu as party chairman and Prime Minister candidate in 2001, and 
defeated Labour Prime Minister Ehud Barak in the Prime Ministerial elections the same 
year. In the elections to the 16th Knesset in 2003, Sharon’s mandate was renewed in a new 
election victory and significant defeat to the Labour party.  
 The Likud of the 16th Knesset had a strong hawkish bent, receiving its support from 
the portions of the Israeli electorate concerned with the security issues that would stem from 
territorial concessions, and with the ethno-nationalists opposed to any territorial compromise 
at all because of principle or religious faith (Sandler 2008: 62). Because of this, the Likud 
was naturally opposed to the Oslo Accords of the 1990s and united in its appreciation of the 
collapse of the Accords in the early 2000s, but there was still tension within the party 
between the two factions as the mainstream of the party, including Netanyahu, realized that 
at least some of the Palestinian territories would be lost in an eventual territorial 
compromise. At the same time, the Israeli electorate was, despite the Palestinian Intifada, 
becoming less extreme regarding security issues and this movement towards the political 
centre led to greater public support for territorial concessions in exchange for peace, 
including the withdrawal from settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. Because of this, and 
because of the pragmatic hawks’ wish to avoid too close association with the extreme right, 
the Likud never rejected cooperation with the Palestinian Authority completely but remained 
firm in that the principle of reciprocity, of mutual concessions, should apply. As Netanyahu 
stated in a statement to Knesset in 1997: ”The fulfillment of the agreement, the fulfillment of 
the undertakings of one side will be dependent upon the fulfillment of the other side. I do not 
know any other interpretation of the word ”agreement” (Sandler 2008: 62).  
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 In February 2004, the Likud was shook with Prime Minister Sharon’s announcement 
of the Disengagement Plan, the government’s plan for unilateral Israeli withdrawal from 
Gaza and parts of the West Bank. This was of course unacceptable for the ethno-nationalists, 
and for the more mainstream party it was a significant divergence from the principle of 
reciprocity which was supposed to ensure Israeli security. Despite general public support for 
the plan (57% of Israelis supported disengagement as opposed to 36% opposing it, according 
to a poll from the time of implementation in August 2005 (Sandler 2008: 23)), its deviation 
from traditional Likud policy was strong enough that in the May 2004 party referendum on 
the Disengagement Plan, it was rejected by the party membership by 59.8 to 39.5 percent 
(Sandler 2008: 63). This rejection was most likely a shock for the Sharon government which, 
knowing the support in the public, assumed similar trends within the party or at least party 
loyalty to the government. This was the first clash between the government and the party, 
and through 2004 and 2005 the conflicts escalated. In March 2005, the government faced 
opposition to their government even from their own party, and in August, just before the 
Disengagement Plan he had voted for were to be implemented, Finance Minister Netanyahu 
resigned from government only to, later the same month, announce his candidacy for party 
chairman and Likud Prime Minister candidate.  
 
10.2 The Likud fragmentizes 
 On August 7 2005, Finance Minister Netanyahu resigned from his government 
position shortly before the implementation of the Disengagement Plan that had the 
Knesset’s, but not the party’s, support. This earned him accusations of deserting his 
responsibilities from Sharon. On August 30, he declared his intentions to challenge Sharon 
for the party leadership and Prime Minister candidacy before the next elections, scheduled 
for November 2006, accusing Sharon of taking the party to the left and abandoning the 
traditional principles of the Likud (Sandler 2008: 25). This is the beginning of the Kadima 
Game.  
 The two men, not the only candidates for the chairmanship but the only realistic ones, 
were much alike in many respects. Both were long-standing members of the Likud, 
associated with the party’s political right. Both had served many years in the Knesset, 
Netanyahu since 1988, Sharon since his retirement from the IDF in 1973, and had been 
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members of different governments during the Likud’s dominance since 1977. Netanyahu 
held the chairmanship from 1993 until he was defeated in the party elections by Sharon in 
1999, and served as Prime Minister for the party 1996-99. Netanyahu had a record as a hard-
liner in the Israeli-Palestinian relations, Sharon had a distinguished military career and had 
won great public and party support in his handling of the Second Intifada during his term as 
Prime Minister (Sandler 2008: 62). He was also significantly older than Netanyahu, being 77 
years old to the latter’s 56, a fact that was of some importance in the subsequent events.  
 Another difference between the two men, evident in polls in the month after 
Netanyahu’s resignation but hardly unknown to either at the time, was the differences in 
popularity. Due to the skepticism with which the Likud membership received the 
Disengagement Plan, Netanyahu had the most support in the Likud but at the same time 
Likud under Sharon would do significantly better in the general elections due to his being 
perceived as a more moderate candidate –a fact that could well be used to his advantage in 
the party elections (Sandler 2008: 23-24) as his electability could make him the preferred 
candidate for party members whose personal views were closer to Netanyahu’s.  
 After Netanyahu’s resignation and subsequent self-nomination, attacks between the 
two candidates and their supporters increased. As a result, speculations abounded about a 
split and the establishment of a new party, most likely based around Sharon. They were 
rejected by Sharon’s spokesmen, and Netanyahu called for loyalty to the party (Sandler 
2008: 24-25). In September, Netanyahu attempted to have the Likud elections, scheduled for 
April 2006, forwarded to November 2005. The move was likely an attempt to profit from his 
lead in the Likud party polls, but was narrowly defeated in the Central Committee vote. In 
response to this defeat, when Sharon made a bid to ease his position for the remainder of the 
period by nominating supporters to minister posts in November, Netanyahu’s supporters 
used their positions in the Knesset to reject his nominations (Sandler 2008: 26).  
 On November 20, shortly after Amir Peretz was elected chairman of the Labour 
party, Labour left the Likud-led government. The following day, Sharon asked President 
Moshe Katsav to dissolve the Knesset and schedule early elections in March 2006, and 
immediately left the Likud to form an as-yet unnamed party (Sandler 2008: 26-27). This, as 
will be shown, ends the Kadima Game.  
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10.3 Aftermath 
 Sharon’s new party, eventually named “Kadima” (“Forward”), attracted support not 
only from Sharon’s old party but also from Labour. Shimon Peres, Labour Prime Minister 
1995-96, was the most prominent of these. In the polls, Kadima was shown to have attracted 
large numbers of Labour voters in addition to the majority of Likud voters Sharon brought 
with him, as both Labour and Likud dropped dramatically and Kadima became the largest 
party. Even after Ehud Olmert was elected chairman in January 2006 after Sharon suffered a 
stroke and was removed from politics, Kadima continued to rise in the polls (Sandler 2008: 
28-30). 
 In the Likud, the immediate aftermath of Sharon’s leaving was a rush for leadership 
positions as Sharon supporters left for the newly-founded Kadima and chairman elections 
had to be forwarded. The power struggles was strengthened by the suspicion that Sharon 
supporters would remain in the party as “Trojan horses”, a suspicion that was confirmed 
when a member of the campaign publicity team left for Kadima shortly after his 
appointment. With many prominent members leaving, Netanyahu was elected chairman with 
a clear mandate (Sandler 2008: 27-28, 64-65) despite the party losing even right-wing 
stalwarts considered natural allies of Netanyahu’s faction to the Kadima.  
 In the March 2006 Knesset elections, Kadima won 29 seats with 22.02%, Labour 
won 19 with 15.06%, and the party of the previous government, the Likud, was crippled at 
8.99% and 12 seats, the same number of seats and fewer votes than the religious Shas party 
(Sandler 2008: 3). The leadership conflict between Sharon and Netanyahu, ostensibly over 
the Disengagement Plan and Sharon’s taking the Likud towards the centre, had given Israel 
its first Centre government.  
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10.4 The Kadima game 
 The above chronology of events gives us enough information to identify a number of 
nodes from which we can build the basic structure of this game.  
Given Sharon’s position as party chairman and Prime Minister, he was undoubtedly 
satisfied with the status quo. After all, he was in a position to use his personal popularity and 
governing majority to decide policy despite party critics, as his drive for the Disengagement 
Plan against the will of the party majority shows. If nothing had happened, it seems most 
likely that Sharon would enter the Knesset elections with the Likud, pushing policy towards 
the political centre. Sharon, then, would hardly make the first move in this game.  
Hence, the first move belongs to Netanyahu. It is Netanyahu who, seeing the 
discontent within the party, makes a choice on whether or not to challenge Sharon’s 
leadership. This is the first node in the game. Netanyahu has effectively two options to 
consider. The first option, called ‘Status Quo’ in the following analysis, represents him not 
challenging Sharon’s leadership of the Likud and accepting his position in the party. This 
option ends the game immediately and leaves Sharon in power of the party. The second 
option, called ‘challenge’, would be to resign from his position in the government and stand 
for chairman elections in an attempt to wrest power of the party, and subsequently the 
government, from Sharon. This would continue the game to the next node, forcing Sharon to 
make a decision on how to respond.  
The second node is Sharon’s response to Netanyahu’s leadership challenge. Sharon 
has two options at this point, either to leave the Likud with his supporters and start a new 
centre-oriented party or to take up the challenge and run for chairmanship elections against 
Netanyahu. A third option, resigning from the chairmanship while remaining in the Likud, 
could be argued as a possibility but hardly a realistic one at this point. It would mean a loss 
of prestige and, equally important, political marginalization within a party that disagrees 
with his policies. At the advanced age of 77, Sharon did not have the time to accept defeat 
and bide his time until the next change of party opinion. Leaving the party, however, would 
mean capitalizing on his personal popularity and electability, the public support for the 
Disengagement Plan and the lack of competition in the political centre where his more 
moderate stance belonged, and could gain him a position of power without being dependent 
on the Likud. He would, however, have to do without the established party machine and 
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voter base of the Likud. This option is called ‘Leave Early’. If Sharon chose to leave the 
party, the game would end with the establishment of a new party under Sharon and 
chairmanship elections in the Likud which Netanyahu would be likely to win. Alternatively, 
taking up Netanyahu’s challenge would lead to the next node, chairman elections between 
Sharon and Netanyahu. This option is called ‘Face Elections’.  
 
10.4.1 Introducing Nature 
The third node, elections for Likud chairman, introduces uncertainty to the game. Up 
to this point, the results of the actors’ choices have been quite clear. Elections, however, are 
seldom certain. Netanyahu had greater support within the party because of the ethno-
nationalists’ and the right wing’s disenchantment with Sharon, but Sharon still had 
significant support and the benefit of being far more popular in the public at large, which 
would attract support from the party members concerned with winning the Knesset elections 
first and foremost. There were, of course, other candidates, but only Netanyahu or Sharon 
could reasonably be expected to win. This node hence has two options, ‘Sharon Wins’ and 
‘Netanyahu Wins’ (shortened to ‘S Wins’ and ‘N Wins’ respectively), but which is chosen is 
unknown to the actors until it happens. They can, however, predict their own and each 
others’ actions in either case as there is no reason to believe either actor to be misinformed 
about the other’s preferences in this game.  
If Sharon wins, he will have a renewed mandate for the Likud chairmanship and little 
incentive to make significant moves except strengthen his position and prepare for the 
upcoming Knesset elections. The next choice will be Netanyahu’s. He has, in essence, two 
options: He can stay loyal and bide his time within the party, called ‘N Loyal’ in this 
analysis, or he can leave to start a new list, hoping to attract right-wing voters and ethno-
nationalists unhappy with Sharon’s direction, called ‘N Leave’. With the struggle for power 
in the Likud over for now and the losing actor either striking out on his own or deciding to 
remain loyal, either choice will end the game.  
If Netanyahu wins, the result will mirror the above. He will have the chairmanship 
and the party’s Prime Minister candidacy for the 2006 elections and be more concerned with 
this than with continuing the power struggle with Sharon, a struggle he’s already won. 
Sharon, on the other hand, will need to decide how to handle defeat. His options will be the 
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same as Netanyahu’s if their positions were reversed, he can choose to leave the party to 
start his own list with the same goal as in the second node, called ‘S Leave’, or remain with 
the party, called ‘S Loyal’. Again, either choice will end the game.  
This structure gives us the following game tree:  
Figure 10.1: game tree 
N 
Challenge No Challenge 
 
S  (status quo) 
Leave Early Face Elections    
 
(S leaves early)  Nature      
N Wins  S Wins   
 
S    N   
S Leave  S Loyal  N Leave  N Loyal    
 
(S leaves)  (S loyal) (N leaves)  (N loyal)  
 
10.5 Preferences and Payoff Tables 
 The game tree, however, tells us little by itself. To solve the game, the preferences of 
both players for each possible outcome must be calculated. Although there is uncertainty 
about the chance of each outcome occurring, the game three is uncomplicated enough that it 
is reasonable to assume that the actors were aware of all the different outcomes and so could 
rank their preferences ahead of acting. Also, the game is played within a single political 
party between actors who are both experienced politicians and should be well aware of each 
others’ position and thus each others’ preferences. The sole complicating factor for the 
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players is the uncertainty regarding the elections. To rate the outcomes, then, we must 
ascribe a preference value for each actor to each possible outcome. Since there are 6 possible 
outcomes, the values will be from 1 to 6, 6 being the most preferable. These are ordinal 
rather than nominal values, as their relative weighting is of little importance in this analysis 
compared to their ranking.  
 For Netanyahu, the preferred outcome would obviously be his defeating Sharon in 
the Likud elections, and Sharon remaining loyal to the party. This would give him the 
chairmanship and at the same time avoid losing prominent members and subsequently votes 
to another party, which should compensate for having to accept the presence of a party 
opposition. This outcome is given an ordinal value of 6 for Netanyahu.  
 Netanyahu’s second preference would be Sharon leaving after losing the elections. 
Netanyahu would be in power, but the loss of Sharon and his supporters would lose the party 
prestige and votes and would therefore reduce the party’s chances in the Knesset elections 
compared to if the party opposition remained loyal, making it a less favourable outcome than 
the above. This outcome is given an ordinal value of 5 for Netanyahu.  
 His third preference would be for Sharon to leave the party without standing for the 
chairman elections. As above, this would leave Netanyahu in power but likely hurt the 
Likud’s Knesset representation. The main difference to the above outcome is that, without 
the strain of internal elections and subsequent loss of prestige when losing, Sharon’s 
departure would most likely damage the Likud more than if he were to leave the party after 
the party elections. Therefore, this outcome is given an ordinal value of 4.  
 The fourth preference would be to lose the elections but remain within the party. 
While far inferior to getting the chairmanship, challenging Sharon and losing would at the 
very least be a statement to the party that would hopefully cement Netanyahu’s position as 
the leader of the internal opposition, and at best a reduced mandate would damage Sharon’s 
standing within the party and thus prepare the ground for Netanyahu’s victory in the next 
round. Unlike Sharon, Netanyahu could, at age 56, afford to bide his time. This outcome is 
given an ordinal value of 3.  
Netanyahu’s fifth and second-last preference would be to accept the status quo and 
remain with the government without challenging Sharon’s position. This would be the most 
beneficial outcome for the party, which would avoid divisive leadership struggles while 
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retaining the leader with the most appeal to outside voters, but not for Netanyahu personally. 
By not challenging Sharon’s position his position as leader of the internal party opposition 
could be compromised, and his chances of returning to power in the Likud would be less 
than if he challenged –especially as his support was largely based on the traditionally 
hawkish and ethno-nationalist party segments, which were unhappy with Sharon and looked 
for a change in party leadership. With this in mind, this outcome is given an ordinal value of 
2.  
 Netanyahu’s sixth and least preferred outcome would be leaving to form a new party 
after losing the party elections. His base of support was, to a large degree, traditional Likud 
voters and segments of the Likud party machine, and unlike a specific subgroup these were 
votes he could not depend on following him if he left the party. With the volatility of the 
Israeli party system he could most likely expect to be elected as an independent, but that 
would hardly carry the same weight as being the leader, or even an important member, of a 
major party. Because of this, and because of his position as heir apparent to the Likud, 
waiting and planning ahead would most likely be expected to give better payoffs. This 
outcome is therefore given an ordinal value of 1 for Netanyahu.  
 Sharon’s expectations are, to some degree, a mirror to Netanyahu’s. His preferred 
outcome would quite obviously be for Netanyahu not to challenge in the first node. Sharon 
already had the leadership of a major Knesset party as well as a significant following outside 
the party, if he remained party leader of a reasonably united party he would be a strong 
candidate for Prime Minister in the upcoming elections. Also, of all the possible outcomes, 
this carried the least risk for his political career. It seems obvious that this outcome should be 
given an ordinal value of 6.  
 His second most preferred outcome would be to win the internal elections and for 
Netanyahu to remain loyal to the party. Although Netanyahu’s challenge would cause some 
internal division, he would still have the party machine and party electorate as well as his 
external support behind him in the upcoming elections and could expect to do well. This 
outcome is given an ordinal value of 5 for Sharon.  
 Sharon’s third preferred outcome would be to win the internal elections and for 
Netanyahu to leave. While a problematic opponent within the party, Netanyahu had strong 
support among segments of the traditional Likud electorate and would most likely bring a 
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significant number of voters with him to a new list or another party. Therefore, his leaving 
would be less appealing to Sharon than if he remained loyal to the party, but at least Sharon 
would remain head of the Likud and able to benefit from its voter base and party machine. 
This outcome is given an ordinal value of 4.  
 Sharon’s fourth preferred outcome would be to leave the Likud before the internal 
elections. This was, for the aforementioned reasons, an obviously less attractive outcome 
than remaining leader of the Likud. However, with his strong support among the voters and 
his considerable following within the Likud, he could count on being reelected and most 
likely do reasonably well. Remaining within the Likud after losing power would most likely 
marginalize him for the rest of his political career as he could ill afford to play the waiting 
game due to his advanced age. If losing the elections was likely, leaving beforehand would 
have a number of benefits. First, it would save time before the Knesset elections –time that 
would be needed to build a new party or electoral list. Second, he would not have to spend 
political capital and exhaust his supporters’ favour before the Knesset elections, likely 
strengthening his support from ex-Likud members. Third, he would avoid losing, most likely 
making him more electable as well as making his new party a more “legitimate” haven for 
dissatisfied Likud members as he wouldn’t seem like a poor loser. Thus, this outcome is 
given an ordinal value of 3.  
 Sharon’s fifth and second last preference would be to leave the Likud after losing the 
internal elections. Like the fourth outcome, this would avoid marginalization. However, he 
would likely have spent time, political capital and support he could ill afford before losing, 
and as a result his new party’s Knesset position would most likely be weakened compared to 
his leaving earlier. Therefore, this outcome is given an ordinal value of 2 for Sharon.  
 The sixth and least preferred outcome would be to stay with the Likud after losing the 
internal elections. As already mentioned, with his political rival as head of the party he 
would have to expect political marginalization for some time –an unattractive position due to 
his advanced age, especially given the likely superior alternatives at hand. This outcome is 
given an ordinal value of 1.  
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 The above list of preferences gives us the following payoff table, where N is 
Netanyahu and S is Sharon:  
Figure 10.2: payoff table 
 Netanyahu Sharon 
Status Quo 2 6 
Leave Early 4 3 
S Leaves 5 2 
S Loyal 6 1 
N Leaves 1 4 
N Loyal 3 5 
 Introducing the payoff table to the game, we get the following game tree:  
Figure 10.3: game tree with payoffs 
N 
Challenge No Challenge 
 
S  (2,6)  
Leave Early Face Elections    
 
(4,3)  Nature      
N Wins  S Wins   
 
S    N   
S Leave  S Loyal  N Leave  N Loyal    
 
(5,2)  (6,1)  (1,4)  (3,5)     
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10.6 Introducing Nature: the Likud elections 
 The actors in this game, Binyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon, make their decisions 
with knowledge of the possible outcomes and the preferences of themselves and each other. 
However, there is still uncertainty about the outcome due to the unpredictability of the 
internal Likud elections. This is represented by the Nature node.  
 Nature forces the actors to evaluate the respective chances of the different 
outcomes, in this case whether Sharon or Netanyahu will win the Likud’s internal elections, 
and weigh the chances of each outcome against their expected payoffs. The probable 
outcome of Nature will therefore affect the actors’ choices in the earlier nodes. Since 
Nature’s outcome determines the actor in the following and final node of the game, it is 
useful to start by solving the Nature sub-game. It is a simple game in itself, with each actor 
having just one choice that leads to a final outcome.  
For Sharon, a payoff of 2 (S Leave) is preferable to a payoff of 1 (S loyal). He will 
therefore opt to leave the party, giving a payoff of (5,2). If, however, Sharon wins the 
elections Netanyahu will have the choice between a payoff of 1 (N Leave) and a payoff of 3 
(N loyal). He will choose the more preferable 3, giving a payoff of (3,5). Since Nature has 
already decided who won the Likud elections and therefore which actor gets to take the next 
choice in the game, the outcomes of the competing player’s alternatives are of course 
irrelevant to the actor at this point. They are, after all, no longer viable outcomes.  
The Nature subgame solved looks like this:  
Figure 10.4: Nature subgame solved 
Nature    
N Wins (p) S Wins (1-p)     
 
S    N   
S Leave  S Loyal  N Leave  N Loyal    
 
(5,2)  (6,1)  (1,4)  (3,5)     
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 However, these outcomes, although final, are dependant on Nature. They are, 
therefore, uncertain. In order to solve the game, we need the actors’ expected payoff from the 
Nature node: the payoff for the outcomes of the subsequent nodes dependent of the chance 
of that outcome occurring. The equation for each actor is as follows:  
E = (p)a + (1-p)b 
Where E is the expected payoff, (p) is the chance of the first outcome and (a) the payoff for 
that outcome, (1-p) is the chance of the second outcome and (b) is the payoff for that 
outcome. This gives us these equations for the two actors, when their respective payoffs are 
factored in:  
E(Netanyahu) = (p)5 + (1-p)3 
E(Sharon) = (p)2 + (1-p)5 
 Solving the above equations, we get the following:  
E(Netanyahu) = (p)5 + (1-p)3 
E(Netanyahu) = 5p + 3 -3p 
E(Netanyahu) = 2p + 3 
 
E(Sharon) = (p)2 + (1-p)5 
E(Sharon) = 2p + 5 -5p 
E(Sharon) = 5 -3p 
 
 The expected payoff for Netanyahu is, as we can see, 2p+3, giving an expected 
payoff for Nature of between 3 (if he expects (p) to equal 0, meaning no chance of winning) 
and 5 (if he expects (p) to equal 1, meaning certain victory). Unsurprisingly, the higher the 
chance of electoral victory ((p)) the higher the expected payoff for Netanyahu.  
 Sharon has an expected payoff of 5-3p, giving an expected payoff for Nature of 
between 5 (If he expects (p) to equal 0, a certain victory) and 2 (meaning an expected (p) of 
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1, a certain loss). Mirroring Netanyahu’s expected payoff, the lower the chance of 
Netanyahu’s victory (p) the higher the expected payoff for Sharon.  
 The next question, then, is how these expected payoffs compare with the certain 
payoffs for alternative outcomes. Although the final outcome of the Nature node is 
uncertain, looking at how the Nature node at different values of (p) compares with the 
alternative choices for the actor is necessary for us to be able to explain the actors’ choices 
and thus solve the game. Since Sharon is the one who decides whether or not the game 
proceeds through the Nature node, we will begin with him.  
 If Sharon gets to act in the Kadima Game, his most preferred outcome of Status Quo 
is no longer an option. His choices at this point are Leaving Early or Facing Elections. 
Leaving Early has an ordinal value of 3, Facing Elections an ordinal value of 5-3p. With (p) 
still being uncertain at this point, it is necessary to identify at what value of (p) one choice is 
preferable to the other. By substituting E in the above equation of Sharon’s expected payoff 
for Facing Elections with the payoff for Leaving Early, we can identify the value of (p) for 
which the two alternatives are equally good. Then, if Sharon perceives (p) to be lower than 
this it is rational to choose Face Elections and if he perceives (p) to be higher than this it is 
rational to choose Leave Early.  
 The equation, then, is 3=5-3p. Solved, it looks like this:  
3 = 5 - 3p 
3 – 5 = - 3p 
-2 = -3p  |:-3 
P = 0.67 
 From this, we see that if Sharon perceives (p) to be equal to 0.67, meaning the chance 
of Netanyahu’s victory in the Likud internal elections is 67%, the payoffs from both 
alternatives have an ordinal value of 3 and are therefore equally beneficial. If he considers 
that (p)<0.67, it follows that the expected payoff from choosing ‘Face Elections’ is higher 
than 3 and therefore higher than the expected payoff from ‘Leave Early’. In sum, if Sharon 
believes he’s got a better than 33% chance at winning the elections he should choose to face 
them, if he believes his chances are worse the rational choice is to leave early.  
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 For Netanyahu, although the procedure is fundamentally the same it is also more 
complex. Because he is dependent upon Sharon’s actions –which in turn are dependent upon 
Sharon’s perception of (p)- there are three possible alternatives with corresponding outcomes 
and payoffs to consider when Netanyahu makes his first move, the outcomes following ‘Face 
Elections’ and the Nature node being combined into the expected payoff calculated earlier. 
These are Status Quo (ordinal value of 2), ‘Leave Early’ (ordinal value of 4) and ‘Face 
Elections’ (ordinal value of 2p+3).  
 Because Leave Early has a higher ordinal value than Status Quo, it is the least 
interesting outcome at this point. What matters to Netanyahu’s decision-making is whether 
or not Face Elections, with the uncertain outcome, is better than Status Quo. If it is, then 
‘Challenge’ will always be a better choice than Status Quo. If it is not, then he will need to 
take Sharon’s preferences into consideration. Either way, the result is dependent upon (p).  
 As with Sharon’s equation above, we can identify at which value of (p) the two 
alternatives –Status Quo and ‘Face Elections’- are equally beneficial to Netanyahu by 
substituting (p) for the expected payoff in his expected payoff equation:  
2 = 2p + 3 
2 – 3 = 2p 
-1 = 2p |:2 
p = -0.5 
 This equation proves what careful reading of the game tree will already have shown: 
That, as a result of Netanyahu’s least preferred outcome being one of the alternatives 
Netanyahu himself can choose –or decide not to choose, as is more likely- and his second 
least preferred outcome being Status Quo, it will always be preferable to choose ‘Challenge’ 
regardless of the perceived value of n. In fact, unless (p) is -0.5 or lower, an obvious 
impossibility given that (p) represents a percentage chance, ‘Challenge’ will be a superior 
choice to Status Quo. Given this, it should come as no surprise if Netanyahu does not decide 
to wait patiently in the wings.  
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10.6.1 For the sake of argument 
 However, just for the sake of argument, we can set up the equation of the expected 
payoff for Netanyahu’s choosing ‘Challenge’ over Status Quo. The equation will be of the 
above formula, E=(p)a+(1-p)b, with (a) being the payoff for Sharon choosing Leave Early 
and (b) being the payoff for his choosing Face Election. Since this is an equation with two 
unknowns, both the chances of Sharon choosing either action and the payoff for Face 
Election being unknown to Netanyahu at this point, we will substitute (x) for the (p) in the 
latter formula. The formula, then, is the following: E=(x)a+(1-x)b. The equation looks like 
this:  
E = (x)a + (1-x)b 
E = (x)4 + (1-x)(2p+3) 
E = 4x + (2p+3) - (2px+3x) 
E = 4x + 2p + 3 - 2px - 3x 
E = x + 2p - 2px + 3 
 Of course, with two unknowns this expected payoff from Netanyahu’s choice of 
Challenge does not tell us much. In order to get a meaningful comparison between the 
alternatives, which is after all the objective, one of the unknowns has to go: either the 
unknown chance of election outcome, or the unknown chance of Sharon choosing one action 
over the other. Assuming Netanyahu was indeed aware of Sharon’s preferences, though, he 
would also know at which value of (p) –at what chance of election loss- Sharon’s choices 
would be equally beneficial, translating to a 50% chance of either action. If (p)=0.67, it 
follows that (x)=0.5. Substituting numbers for letters in the equation, Netanyahu gets the 
following expected payoff for Challenge –given (p)=0.67, of course:  
E = x + 2n - 2px + 3 
E = 0.5 + 2(0.67) - 2(0.5)(0.67) + 3 
E = 4.17 
 So, given an expected 67% chance of Netanyahu winning the elections, as perceived 
by Sharon, Netanyahu would have an expected payoff of 4.17 on challenge. In the same 
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vein, assuming that if Sharon is certain of losing (p = 1) then he will undoubtedly choose 
‘Leave Early’ (x = 1) and if he is certain of winning (p = 0) he will choose Face Elections (x 
= 0), we get the following equations:  
 
If p = 1:   |  If p = 0: 
E = x + 2p - 2px + 3  |  E = x + 2n - 2px + 3 
E = 1 + 2(1) - 2(1)(1) + 3 |  E = 0 + 2(0) - 2(0)(0) + 3 
E = 1 + 2 – 2 + 3  |  E = 2 – 2 + 3 
E = 4    |  E = 3 
 
 Unsurprisingly, the expected payoffs for choosing Challenge in these instances both 
match perfectly the payoffs for Sharon choosing Leave Early (4) and for Sharon choosing 
Face Elections, winning, and Netanyahu choosing N loyal (3). This exercise is, however, 
largely academic for the reasons already mentioned: Any likely outcome of ‘Challenge’ is 
preferable to Status Quo because Netanyahu will always have the choice whether or not to 
leave the party (N Leave), his least preferred outcome, and Status Quo is his second least 
preferred.  
 Having solved the Nature sub-game and discussed the expected payoffs from Nature 
for both actors, we can return to the greater Kadima Game.  
 
10.7 Solving the Kadima Game 
 After identifying the different nodes and the alternatives at each node, as well as the 
preferences of each actor regarding the possible outcomes, can now solve the game. To do 
this, we will work backwards and eliminate the sub-optimal choices for each actor. We’ll 
start by repeating the Nature sub-game:  
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Figure 10.6: Nature subgame solved, again 
Nature    
N Wins (p) S Wins (1-p)     
 
S    N   
S Leave  S Loyal  N Leave  N Loyal    
 
(5,2)  (6,1)  (1,4)  (3,5)   
 
 As already seen, this game gives Netanyahu an expected payoff of 2p+3 and Sharon 
5-3p, making payoffs dependent on the value of (p) and, therefore, the attraction of ‘Face 
Election’ dependent on the actor’s perceived chance of winning the elections –the perceived 
value of (p).  
 For Sharon, then, assuming Netanyahu chooses Challenge in the first node, the 
question is whether or not to choose ‘Leave Early’ (payoff 3) or ‘Face Election’ (payoff 5-
3p). As already discussed, if (p) is perceived to be 0.67 these are equally good, if it is higher 
than this Leave Early is preferable and if it is lower than this Face Election is preferable. The 
question, then, is Sharon’s perception of his chance of winning the Likud internal election.  
 Despite an increasing acceptance of territorial compromise in the electorate and even 
within the Likud, the party referendum on May 4. 2004 proved that Sharon’s unilateralist 
stance concerning the Disengagement Plan was not shared by even 40% of the party 
electorate (Sandler 2008: 63). This unexpected loss must have given him pause, especially 
because of his rival’s stance matching the party majority. As dissent grew after the 
implementation of the Disengagement Plan and came to a head with the attempt at forcing an 
early leadership election in September and the subsequent sabotage of his appointment of 
Zeev Boim and Roni Bar-On to the Likud Knesset faction in November, Sharon could 
harbour little doubt that there was significant support for a change of party leadership. He 
would have good reason to conclude that his chances of losing the internal elections were 
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worse than 67% and so Leave Early would be the rational choice. As we know, this was the 
action he took.  
 Because of the three and a half month delay between Netanyahu’s first node and 
Sharon’s first node, it is likely that Netanyahu’s perception of his popularity and, as 
importantly, his perception of Sharon’s perception of Netanyahu’s popularity, changed 
somewhat with the events in the interim period. However, as we have already seen, 
regardless of his electoral chances Challenge would be considered the better option, though 
with the events preceding his resignation and challenge he would have good reason to be 
optimistic. His rational choice of action, which was also the action he took, would therefore 
be to challenge Sharon.  
 Solved, the Kadima game tree looks like this:  
 
Figure 10.7: Kadima game solved 
N 
Challenge No Challenge 
 
S  (2,6)  
Leave Early Face Elections    
 
(4,3)  Nature      
N Wins (p) S Wins (1-p)   
 
S    N   
S Leave  S Loyal  N Leave  N Loyal    
 
(5,2)  (6,1)  (1,4)  (3,5)     
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 As we can see, the outcome is ‘Leave Early’, with the payoffs (4,3). This is also a 
Pareto optimal outcome (as are, in fact, all the likely outcomes if we don’t consider ‘Sharon 
Loyal’ or ‘Netanyahu Leaves’ to be likely), as no other outcome can give a higher payoff for 
one actor without reducing the payoff for the other. This game also represents a Bayes’ 
Perfect equilibrium as the strategies chosen are the best responses given the actors’ 
perceptions of the unknown factor, their respective chances of victory in the Likud elections.  
 The final question regarding the Kadima Game is the identification of dominant 
strategies. In order to do this, it is useful to convert the game to the static form. To do this, 
we identify the outcomes ending the game available to each actor. These are, of course, 
dependent upon the game progressing to a certain point and therefore dependent upon the 
choices of the other actor, but due to the relatively simple nature of the game these are not 
problems. There is, for each actor, never more than one choice that will let the game 
continue, and therefore the outcome of ‘N Leaves’, for instance, will have to be preceded by 
‘Challenge’ and ‘Face Elections’. In the static form, the Kadima Game looks like this:  
Figure 10.8: static game 
N Wins S Wins  
S S 
 Leave Early S Leaves S Loyal Leave Early S Leaves S Loyal 
Status Quo 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 
N Leaves 4,3 5,2 6,1 4,3 1,4 1,4 
N Loyal 4,3 5,2 6,1 4,3 3,5 3,5 
 
 
 
 
N 
 p (1-p) 
 
 Looking at Netanyahu’s options, then, it is clear that ‘N Loyal’ –choosing 
‘Challenge’ in the first node and then choose ‘Loyal’ if the game progresses to his second 
node- will be a weakly dominant strategy. It will have higher payoffs than Status Quo 
regardless of the strategy chosen by Sharon, the same payoffs as ‘N Leaves’ if Sharon 
chooses ‘Leave Early’ or Netanyahu wins the elections, and higher payoffs than ‘N Leaves’ 
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if Sharon wins. From this, it follows that ‘Status Quo’ is strongly dominated and ‘N Leaves’ 
weakly dominated by ‘N Leaves’.  
Sharon, on the other hand, does not have a dominant strategy since his strategies to a 
larger degree is dependent upon the outcome of the elections. ‘Leave Early’ is weakly 
dominant (since it the payoff if Netanyahu chooses ‘Status Quo’ will be the same regardless) 
as long as Netanyahu wins, but in the case of Sharon winning the elections both ‘S Leaves’ 
and ‘S Loyal’ (which are the strategies leading to facing the very elections he’s won) are 
superior. It all then, again, comes down to Sharon’s perception of (p).  
 
10.8 Kadima Game: Conclusions and aftermath 
 With the internal party dissent in the autumn of 2005, Netanyahu’s choice to 
challenge Sharon seems an obvious one. Considering his position in the party at the time, 
there was simply little risk involved with potentially significant gains. The key to this is, of 
course, that even if losing the elections he would strengthen his position because he could 
always avoid his least preferred outcome. The only problem of any significance, it seems, 
would be the conflict weakening the party relative to its rivals. However, considering the fact 
that this conflict was over the Likud’s core tenets of security and territory, and their 
importance both to Netanyahu’s political views as well as those of his supporters, 
challenging Sharon seems the rational choice even without considering the personal political 
gains. Challenging and opting to stay loyal in case of an (increasingly unlikely, as the game 
progressed) electoral loss would net him the best possible result regardless of the actions of 
Sharon and the Likud electorate.  
 For Sharon, as we have seen, the situation was more complicated. Since he did not 
start the game, his options were of course more limited. He did not, for one, have any say in 
whether or not his preferred outcome, Status Quo and a relatively united party preparing for 
the Knesset elections, would be chosen. In addition, the potential election results played a 
much greater role in his strategy because, unlike Netanyahu’s, they would actually determine 
which alternative in his first node would turn out to be superior. With the events leading up 
to this node in mind, and considering his age and a probable wish to minimize risks (well-
founded but ultimately meaningless, as it turned out), leaving the Likud to start a new party 
as soon as possible was the rational choice.  
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 As a result of the Kadima Game, Sharon left the Likud to found a new party, Kadima, 
with old allies from Likud and members of other parties including Labour. Netanyahu went 
on to win the Likud internal elections. Sharon’s stroke in January 2006 removed him from 
politics and made former Likud-member Ehud Olmert party leader, and Olmert went on to 
win the elections and become Prime Minister in April 2006.  
 
11.0 Summing up and Conclusions 
11.1 Summing up 
 From the early days of Zionist immigration to Palestine, the Zionist organizations 
were dominated by Ashkenazim with secularist, socialist views and a relatively pragmatic 
stance on cooperation with the Mandate authorities and the question of the territories of the 
Zionist project. Though dominant in the Yishuv, these did not go unchallenged as the other 
side of these cleavages became manifest through Zionist hardliners with religious and anti-
socialist sympathies. This struggle over the nature of the Yishuv and the Jewish state in the 
making came to a head with the Altalena affair in 1948. As we have seen, the outcome of 
that game did indeed factor heavily in the forming of the new state. With the miscalculation 
of Ben-Gurion’s priorities, Begin and the Irgun became politically marginalized. The victors, 
David Ben-Gurion and what would become the Labour party, were given rein to centralize 
power, increase the role of the state and ensure the monopoly of violence. This dominance of 
the Labour party continued until 1977.  
 The long period of governance gave the statist, socialist-secular party the chance to 
implement many of its policies, which ironically actually weakened it as the state replaced 
the party and its allies as service providers. “Governing sickness”, scandals and 
unresponsiveness to the electorate weakened the Labour party further. With the wars in 1967 
and especially in 1973 the security issue and thus the Zionist cleavage became more 
prominent again, increasing the appeal of the system-opposition party Likud. As public 
dissatisfaction with the government and internal demands for party reforms increased, the 
party elite trusted in the inertia of the party system and the Likud’s old reputation as 
dangerous dissidents from the previous power struggle. This trust was misplaced, as the 
Likud’s successful appeal to dissatisfied groups and the reemergence of the Zionist issue to 
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replace Labour’s traditional core issues let it replace Labour as governing party in 1977. The 
Likud would continue to dominate Israeli politics until 2006.  
 The Likud’s dominance was, while significant, never as strong as Labour’s in the 
previous era and during the 1990s, with the first Palestinian Intifada and the influx of Eastern 
immigrants, the support for other parties than Labour and the Likud increased. The 
combined support for the two largest parties was reduced from 59.6% in 1992 to 43.9% in 
2003 (Knesset 2009). Then, in 2005, Ariel Sharon’s attempt to move the Likud to a more 
moderate stance on the Zionism and security issue met with strong opposition. In the end he 
left the party and founded the Kadima, using his personal popularity to attract notable 
politicians from several parties. The centrist Kadima went on to become the largest party in 
the Knesset in 2006 and again in 2009, strengthening the case for the end of the Likud’s 
dominance and the Israeli two-party-dominant system.  
 Israel began its transition to a democracy from the British non-democratic Mandate 
rule on independence in 1948, building on the democratic traditions the immigrants to the 
Yishuv brought from Europe. The founding election of the Israeli took place shortly after the 
Altalena affair and subsequent marginalization of what was to become the Likud, and 
confirmed Labour’s victory in that power struggle. With Labour’s loss of power in 1977 the 
Likud is redeemed and gains the power in the critical election, and through the subsequent 
transfers of power the Israeli democracy is confirmed. Then, in what can be called the 
revitalizing election, the gradual erosion of the two-party-dominance culminates in the 
victory of the Kadima, after which the Israeli party system no longer has had parties big 
enough to form government without other major parties. Because of the lack of authoritarian 
residue the state- and nation-building process is short but the transition period, because of 
Labour’s long monopoly of power, is long and becomes longer if the revitalization election 
is included.  
 The three mahapacs are aptly named. The first effectively ends the power struggle of 
the pre-independence era and establishes a long-lasting political dominance. The second 
ends this political dominance and replaces it with another. The third promises to end party 
dominance altogether –at least for a time. There can be no doubt that these three are 
significant events in the shaping of Israeli power distribution. Significantly, they coincide 
with the steps of the Israeli democratic transition. The first mahapac is the culmination of a 
conflict that escalated as the stakes got higher with the promise of independence and thus the 
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first phase in transition. The second mahapac is by its very nature the second phase in 
transition. The third is the culmination of a process that gathered momentum through the 
1990s, and it is the emergence of a third major party that, through its very existence, reduces 
the other major parties and levels the field that made the Israeli multi-party system probable. 
The links between the mahapacs and Israeli transition from Mandate rule to democracy are 
clearly not coincidental.  
 
11.2 Game Theory and the three mahapacs 
 With the link between Israel’s transition and the three mahapacs, it is time to look at 
the analytical method of this thesis: Game Theory. Is this method a useful tool for these 
kinds of analyses? 
 Game Theory does have its limitations. Because it focuses on the actions of very few 
individuals towards a specific goal, it requires events with easily identifiable actors and 
available strategies, clear objectives and preferably a limited time span. Naturally, this limits 
the events for which Game Theory can be used to analyze decision-making processes 
without resorting to fabricating actors, preferences or strategies. The key to successful use of 
Game Theory lies in extensive background research.  
 The three games played in this analysis differ most significantly on the actors 
involved. The first and third games are examples of classic Game Theory, in that they 
portray struggles between clearly identified individuals. The Altalena Game between David 
Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin and the Kadima Game between Ariel Sharon and 
Binyamin Netanyahu are the results of personal conflicts as much as anything. This makes 
the actors easily identifiable, and as a result their goals, preferences and sequence of 
strategies can be found in their backgrounds and in the descriptions of the events and can be 
expected to be reasonably correct. Their links to the events in question, the mahapacs, are 
also unquestionable. The second game is more problematic, as the actors are not individuals 
but groups of people. This makes the correct identification of goals and preferences far more 
difficult. However, a study of the background and composition of the party and the internal 
conflict it faced nevertheless provides us with enough information to construct a useful game 
around it.  
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 The three games played differ in many respects, but they have one important thing in 
common: the outcome of all three games depend heavily on the uncertainty introduced 
through the Nature node. The Altalena Game ends in the worst possible outcome for Begin, 
as he misestimates Ben-Gurion’s Nature. The Mahapac Game ends with the least preferred 
result for both actors, based on the Elite’s underestimation of the challenge posed by the 
Likud. The Kadima Game ends with a seemingly acceptable result for both, but ends early as 
a result of one actor choosing the safe course of not having to deal with Nature.  
 This common trait is important, but hardly surprising. The three events portrayed are 
all key events that determine the distribution of power at the time, and all are played between 
seasoned politicians. Since there is no reason to assume irrational behaviour on the part of 
any of the actors, uncertainty is the best explanation for the undesirable results –excepting 
Sharon, who understood the nature of the gamble and chose to avoid it.  
 Is Game Theory a useful tool? I believe it is. By breaking down an event into its 
components we gain valuable insight over the process itself and the actions and motivations 
of the actors. While reducing complex processes to simple games is risky, it becomes 
considerably less so by taking into consideration the process leading up to the climax in 
question. Game Theory, given suitable background research, is indeed a useful tool.  
 Despite these being games with uncertainty played on the extensive form, Bayes’ 
Rule has not been emphasized. The reason for this is simple: these three games are all played 
over a relatively short span of time, with relatively few actor nodes. In no game does one of 
the actors have more than two possible nodes in which to choose a strategy, and there is no 
example of new information causing an actor to rethink his preferences or those of his 
opponents. The nearest example is new information causing a reevaluation of probabilities, 
but this is already covered through uncertainty. Therefore, while the principle of updating 
information and making choices based on this is indeed important there is simply insufficient 
scope for Bayes’ Rule to be usefully implemented. 
 
11.3 Conclusions: revitalization in transition 
 This thesis has used Game Theory to analyze in detail the three mahapacs in Israeli 
politics and ties these three events to the Israeli transition from Mandate to democracy.  
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 The last phase of this transition is, perhaps, the most interesting. After the 
revitalization election in 2006, five parties in the 120-seat Knesset had 10 or more seats and 
the two largest parties held only 37.1% of the votes. In the following election in 2009, the 
same five parties held more than 10 seats, though the combined votes of the two largest 
parties total to 44.1%. Compare this to the preceding Knessets: In 2003, four parties held 
more than 10 seats and the total for Labour and Likud was 43.9%. In 1999, four parties held 
more than 10 seats and Labour and Likud totaled at 34.3%. After the 1996 election only 
three parties held that many seats, and the total for the two largest was 43.3%. In 1992, three 
parties with a total of 59.6% for the two. In 1988, two parties with a total of 61.1%. In 1984, 
again two parties with a total of 66.8%. In 1981, again only Labour and the Likud above ten 
seats, with a total of 73.7% of the vote (Knesset 2009). The trend has been clear since 1981, 
and has gathered momentum: Labour and the Likud has lost voter percentage and seats to the 
multitude of other parties, and more parties in the notoriously volatile Israeli party system 
grow large enough to challenge the big two. Eventually, it is no longer possible for a single 
major party to form a government with only minor coalition partners. This may have been 
true for some time before 2006, as later governments have been ‘national unity’ governments 
including both Labour and the Likud, but the first third party to form a government is 
undoubtedly the catalyst of this process. With the reduction in power of the major parties and 
the growth of parties like Shas and Avigdor Liebermann’s Yisrael Beitenu, even a 
government without neither the Likud nor Labour is possible, if not plausible as of yet.  
 The phases of Israel’s transition from Mandate to democracy have been marked with 
clear ‘turnabouts’. It remains to be seen whether Israel has truly reached a third phase and a 
revitalization election, but for now it seems like the founding of the Kadima before the 2006 
elections was indeed a third mahapac and that the revitalization election is indeed a useful 
addition to traditional transition theory.   
 From the Game Theoretical analysis of the three mahapacs I will further postulate 
that in any game played at a high level between experienced actors over actual stakes, 
uncertainty will always be a factor. As a result, there are no safe choices.  
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